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Abstract
This paper studies the transmission of US monetary shocks across the globe
by employing a high-frequency identification of policy shocks and large VAR tech-
niques, in conjunction with a large macro-financial dataset of global and national
indicators covering both advanced and emerging economies. Our identification
controls for the information effects of monetary policy and allows for the separate
analysis of tightenings and loosenings of the policy stance. First, we document
that US policy shocks have large real and nominal spillover effects that affect both
advanced economies and emerging markets. Policy actions cannot fully isolate na-
tional economies, even in the case of advanced economies with flexible exchange
rates. Second, we investigate the channels of transmission and find that both trade
and financial channels are activated and that there is an independent role for oil
and commodity prices. Third, we show that effects are asymmetric and larger in
the case of contractionary US monetary policy shocks. Finally, we contrast the
transmission mechanisms of countries with different exchange rates, exposure to
the dollar, and capital control regimes.
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1 Introduction
What is the global impact of US monetary policy actions? The adoption of the US dollar
by the transnational banking system and ever deeper trade and financial integration
mean that the implications of Fed decisions extend well beyond the borders of the United
States. A critical question for policymakers in advanced and emerging markets is how
to adjust monetary policy to neutralise spillovers from US monetary policy actions.
We contribute to this debate by providing robust evidence on the propagation of US
monetary policy. We use a state-of-the-art high-frequency identification of monetary
shocks and large data techniques to assess outcomes for global and national indicators
covering 30 advanced and emerging economies.
The classic Mundell-Fleming model identifies two international transmission channels
for US monetary policy. First, an increase in US interest rates has a contractionary effect
domestically which translates to lower demand for both domestic and foreign goods
(demand-augmenting effect). Second, as the dollar appreciates, foreign goods become
relatively cheaper, moving the composition of global demand away from US goods and
towards foreign goods (expenditure-switching effect). These two channels should at
least partially offset each other. However, there can be a third, financial transmission
channel – risk-taking and international credit – which occurs through the balance sheets
of global financial intermediaries (Rey, 2013, 2016; Farhi and Werning, 2014; Bruno and
Shin, 2015a,b). A Fed rate hike transmits along the yield curve at longer maturities
and reduces the price of risky financial assets. Portfolio rebalancing by investors in the
integrated global financial market determines capital outflows in foreign countries and
induces upward pressure on foreign longer-term yields and downward price revisions
of foreign assets. Furthermore, a higher US interest rate raises the funding cost of
major global banks, which provide credit to many advanced and emerging economies.
Due to such adverse balance sheet effects, financial conditions abroad may deteriorate
substantially with powerful destabilising effects.
The combined effect of the three channels implies a difficult trade-off for central
banks. Faced with a contractionary policy action in the US, a foreign central bank
would want to lower its rate to counter the negative demand shock. However, such an
action risks worsening the adverse balance sheet effects, leading to even larger capital
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outflows and further destabilisation. As observed by Rey (2013) in her seminal work,
this trade-off between open capital flows and independent monetary policies can reduce
the Mundell and Fleming’s trilemma to a ‘dilemma’.1 Importantly, movements in risk
premia can shift the yield curve and further impair the transmission of monetary policy
actions to the economy, limiting the policy space of central banks (see Kalemli-O¨zcan,
2019).
The effect of US monetary policy spillovers is ultimately an empirical question, yet
the existing literature is still fairly limited due to the technical difficulties in identifying
monetary policy shocks and summarising their transmission over hundreds of variables
across several economies. In his Mundell-Fleming lecture, Bernanke (2017) summarised
the challenges to the existent evidence. First, monetary policy actions are largely endo-
genous to the economic conditions and have strong signalling and coordination effects,
also documented in the recent literature – see, for example, Miranda-Agrippino and
Ricco (2017) and Jarocin´ski and Karadi (forthcoming). Second, the limited availability
of data at a higher frequency on financial and cross-border flows has constrained much
of the literature.2 Finally, there are many dimensions along which countries may differ
– their cyclical positions and structural features such as trade exposure, financial ex-
posure, openness to capital flows, exchange rate and policy regimes. These dimensions
have been largely left unexplored due to a lack of data.
We take on these three challenges to provide robust estimates of the impact of US
monetary policy across the globe. First, we employ a state-of-the-art high-frequency
identification (HFI) obtained from intraday price revisions of federal funds futures in
tight windows around policy announcements, as originally proposed by Gu¨rkaynak et al.
(2005) and adopted in the VAR literature by Gertler and Karadi (2015). We disentangle
policy shocks from signalling effects, by directly controlling for the information channel
1According to Mundell and Fleming’s Trilemma, a country can only choose two out of three sim-
ultaneously impossible objectives – free capital flow, independent monetary policy, and a flexible or
targeted exchange rate. Hence, central banks of economies with a floating exchange rate can set interest
rates autonomously with the goal of stabilising their economy, while allowing for free capital flows.
2Given the lack of data at a higher frequency on cross-border flows, a large part of the existent
empirical research, using quarterly data, has reported the effects of US monetary policy on capital
inflows and outflows taking place over long periods of time – i.e. 12-16 quarters – well beyond the
expected time-scale for high-frequency phenomena. These reported effects are possibly due to other
structural shocks contaminating the identification.
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of monetary policy as proposed by Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2017).3 This is critical
to not confounding the effects of monetary policy shocks with the propagation of other
global shocks to which the Fed may be responding.
Second, we construct a large global dataset including a comprehensive set of mac-
roeconomic and financial variables covering the US, 15 advanced and 15 emerging eco-
nomies, and a rich set of global indicators. Importantly, we include a large dataset of
indexes of credit flows and liquidity conditions.4 All of our data and our instrument for
monetary policy shocks are at monthly frequency and span the period 1990:1 to 2018:9 –
hence the coverage and the frequency of the data allow for the study of the effects of US
policy on financial variables and capital flows at reasonably high frequency. Containing
over 150,000 data-points in total, our dataset qualifies as ‘big data’.5
Third, we investigate the global transmission of US monetary policy shocks on the
global economy as a whole and on 15 advanced and 15 emerging economies. Using the
high-frequency instrument, we identify the effects of a US monetary policy shock in a
large-scale Bayesian SVAR-IV/Proxy SVAR incorporating 30 global and US macroeco-
nomic indicators (see Stock and Watson, 2012 and Mertens and Ravn, 2013). Then, we
study the responses of individual economies and provide median responses for selected
groups of countries based on bilateral Bayesian SVAR-IV specifications.6 Our rich em-
pirical framework allows us to control for the heterogeneity among countries due to their
cyclical/financial market position via the VAR structure. Moreover, we group countries
3Our instrument is constructed as the residual of a regression of high-frequency market surprises
of Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005) onto their own lags and Greenbook forecasts and revisions. In doing so we
directly control for the informational component of the policy announcements, due to the systematic
component of the monetary policy rule. Hence, we define monetary policy shocks as the component
of market surprises triggered by policy announcements, unforecastable by past market surprises and
orthogonal to the central bank’s macroeconomic forecasts.
4We employ Cross Border Capital Ltd indicators on liquidity and financial conditions, covering all
of the economies of interest at monthly frequency. The underlying data are mostly publicly available
data from BIS, statistical offices, and markets. The dataset is described in Table A.1 in the online
appendix.
5Our dataset is between two and three orders of magnitude larger than the typical dataset used
to study the domestic effects of U.S. monetary shocks, given the assessment of Iacoviello and Navarro
(2018).
6We incorporate large information sets in our VAR models by employing Bayesian big data tech-
niques. In particular, we estimate a battery of large Bayesian VARs with asymmetric Minnesota priors
(see Banbura et al., 2010, Carriero et al., 2019 and Chan, 2019). In bilateral VARs, the asymmetric
priors allow for parameter restrictions that rule out a direct response of the US policy variable to
economic conditions in a foreign country. This is important in reducing parameter uncertainty and
alleviates multicollinearity regression problems.
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by their (i) income levels, (ii) degree of openness to capital, (iii) exchange rate regimes,
(iv) dollar trade invoicing, and (v) gross dollar exposure to compare median responses
across groups.
Our framework also delivers new insight into the channels of propagation of US
monetary policy shocks, as well as on the potentially asymmetric response of foreign
economies to loosenings and tightenings in the US. We study these asymmetric effects
(i) in the US, (ii) at the global level, (iii) for the advanced, and (iv) for the emerging
economies. We also control for potential non-linearities and model misspecification by
adopting a flexible multivariate local projection setting, in a robustness exercise.
We report a rich set of novel findings. First, we document that following a con-
tractionary (expansionary) US monetary policy shock the global economy contracts
(expands), in line with the US. OECD industrial production, CPI, global real economic
activity and commodity prices exhibit negative (positive) responses, while foreign cur-
rencies depreciate (appreciate). This creates a striking visual image of the role of the
Fed as the global central bank. Importantly, commodity prices, global risk appetite and
global cross-border financial flows all contract (expand). All of them display a strong
co-movement with US credit spreads and VIX. We interpret these results as supporting
the idea that US monetary policy is a driver of the global financial cycle, confirming
Rey (2013)’s observations.
Second, following US shocks, the ‘median’ advanced economy displays strong re-
sponses in output and CPI (less so for core CPI), which move in the same direction
as the US counterparts. Importantly, its trade balance deterioration is a gauge for the
relative strength of price and demand effects. The central bank attempts to counteract
the recessionary pressure by lowering marginally its interest rate, but prices do not re-
vert for at least 18 months. The trade-off between financial stability and countercyclical
effects is evident. Indeed, the US monetary policy shock also moves the long end of
the foreign economy’s yield curve, which reduces the effectiveness of domestic monetary
policy. Moreover, financial conditions deteriorate and cross-border flows turn negative.
Importantly, the country-level responses are much less heterogeneous than previously
reported. We read these results as a strong indication that due to the global financial
cycle and credit-channel effects inflation-targeting central banks in advanced economies
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are confronted with an important trade-off and tend to fail in their price stabilisation
mandates.
Third, the ‘median’ emerging economy responds similarly to the advanced counter-
part. It contracts in response to contractionary US monetary policy shocks. Industrial
production and prices decrease significantly, asset markets adjust downwards and long
term interest rates increase, while risk appetite and financial conditions deteriorate. The
responses of these variables are fairly homogeneous at country level, while interest rates,
capital flows, and policy variables show a marked heterogeneity ascribable to different
policy regimes. Interestingly, the movements in the long term interest rates indicate an
important role for risk premia both in limiting the central bank policy space, and in
creating a constraint to governments borrowing overseas at longer maturities (these res-
ults complement findings in Kalemli-O¨zcan, 2019 on the effects of risk premia on short
term rates and domestic borrowing). We analyse in detail the responses of some of the
largest emerging economies – China, India, and Mexico – and compare policy regimes
and outcomes while benchmarking them against the Euro Area. We further explore this
heterogeneity by grouping the countries by structural characteristics. Importantly, ad-
vanced and emerging economies that are more open in terms of capital flows, as classified
by the Chinn and Ito (2006)’s index, exhibit stronger negative responses of industrial
production and CPI compared to less-open ones. This points to a potential role for
capital controls as an additional policy tool.
Fourth, we provide new evidence on the relative importance of the channels at play.
We study responses of the main macroeconomic indicators of interest to US policy shocks
when selectively zeroing out transmission coefficients of the estimated VAR models on
variables capturing some of the channels of interest. In particular, we consider the role of
(i) the policy rate, (ii) oil and commodity prices, (iii) exchange rates, and (iv) financial
indicators. For the advanced economies, we find that the contractionary response of
oil and commodity prices is an important determinant of the contraction in CPI, while
financial variables and cross-border flows matter for stock market and output responses.
We obtain similar but less clear results for the emerging economies.
Finally, in analysing the differential responses to contractionary and expansionary
US monetary policy shocks, we find some evidence of asymmetric effects. The responses
6
of output and stock prices of the US, the global economy, and third countries are more
persistent in a tightening than in a loosening. CPI instead shows downward rigidity,
that is accounted for by the downward rigidity of oil and commodity prices.
This paper contributes to the literature on the transmission of US monetary policy
in several respects. First, to the best of our knowledge it is the first to adopt a modern
high-frequency identification of US monetary policy that controls for signalling effects
and potential endogeneities. Second, it uses a comprehensive monthly dataset of US,
global, and national macroeconomic variables including data on liquidity, risk appetite,
and cross-border flows. Third, the use of large data techniques allows us to incorporate
and compress into multivariate models information of hundreds of variables across 30
countries and the Euro Area. Fourth, we provide detailed results on the channels and
the asymmetric response to tightenings and loosenings.
Related Literature. Our work is closely related to Rey (2013)’s Jackson Hole
lecture and to a number of her subsequent works with different co-authors Miranda-
Agrippino and Rey (2015), Passari and Rey (2015) and Gerko and Rey (2017) which
have documented a ‘global financial cycle’ in the form of a common factor in inter-
national asset prices and different types of capital flows, closely related to the VIX.
In this body of work He´le`ne Rey has argued that flexible exchange rates cannot fully
insulate economies from the global financial cycle and provided evidence, by using a
high-frequency identification, that US monetary policy is one of the main drivers of the
global financial cycle. Our work is related to this, but distinguished by our use of an
extensive set of countries and variables, and importantly a high-frequency identification
that controls for information effects that are likely to appear as strong confounding
factors at the international level. The works of Dedola et al. (2017), and Iacoviello and
Navarro (2018) are the most closely related to ours in terms of data coverage. Com-
pared to them, we use a cutting-edge SVAR-IV approach with only monthly data and
a pure high-frequency identification, which does not rely on sign restrictions or recurs-
ive identification. Moreover, compared to the latter, we do not focus just on the GDP
responses of foreign economies but on a wider set of indicators, and we do not have
to rely on a recursive identification with timing restrictions that can be problematic in
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analysing financial variables. Georgiadis (2016) and De´es and Galesi (2019) have also
used large panels of countries in a GVAR setting. Unlike this approach, we do not need
to use GDP or trade weights to model international interactions, and we do not use
sign restrictions to identify monetary policy.7 Most of these works find spillovers of US
monetary policy to prices and (sometimes) to real quantities, but report large hetero-
geneity in the response of individual countries.8 Our results only concern conventional
monetary policy and not the more recent unconventional monetary policy actions, that
are discussed in Rogers et al. (2014), Rogers et al. (2018), and in Stavrakeva and Tang
(2015). More broadly, our results fits into the literature on reference (see Ilzetzki et al.,
2019) and dominant currencies (see Gourinchas and Rey, 2007, Gourinchas et al., 2019
and Gopinath et al., 2016).
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 describes the methodology
and the data used in our empirical exercises. Section 3 discusses the effects of U.S.
monetary policy on the global economy. Section 4 and Section 5 study the transmission
of US shocks to a set of advanced and emerging economies respectively, and explore the
domestic dilemmas faced by the domestic central banks. Section 6 focuses on some of the
largest economies – the Euro Area, China, India, and Mexico. Section 7 explores the role
of structural features: capital controls, exchange rate regimes, and the dollar exposure.
Section 8 analyses potentially asymmetric responses to loosenings and tightenings in the
US. Section 9 concludes.
2 Data and Empirical Methodology
To study the effects of US monetary policy shocks to other countries and the global
economy, we adopt a SVAR-IV (also known as Proxy-SVAR) approach (see Stock and
7Some early estimations of spillovers from the US monetary policy are in Kim (2001), Canova
(2005) and in Mackowiak (2007). Other more recent contributions to this literature are in Ehrmann
and Fratzscher (2009), Bluedorn and Bowdler (2011), Akıncı (2013), Ciccarelli et al. (2012), Feldkircher
and Huber (2016), Bhattarai et al. (2017), Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2018), Cesa Bianchi and Sokol
(2017), Vicondoa (2019), Gilchrist et al. (2019), Kalemli-O¨zcan (2019).
8A related literature has focussed on spillovers of US monetary policy through banks using aggregate
banking flows Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012), Bremus and Fratzscher (2015), Buch and Goldberg (2015)
Bruno and Shin (2015b), Argimon et al. (2019), Temesvary et al. (2018), Buch et al. (2019), or using
disaggregated (interbank and intragroup) flows Reinhardt and Riddiough (2015).
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Watson, 2012 and Mertens and Ravn, 2013). We estimate our models with Bayesian
large VAR techniques as in Banbura et al. (2010) and elicit asymmetric Normal Inverse-
Wishart priors, while selecting optimal hyperparameters with the approach proposed
by Giannone et al. (2015). In the following, we describe the building blocks of our
empirical specification: the dataset, the instrument for US monetary policy shocks, the
VAR models and priors adopted.
2.1 Data
In total, our dataset contains over 150,000 data-points covering the US, 30 foreign
economies, the Euro Area as an aggregate, and global economic indicators. All variables
are monthly.9 Most of our data are publicly available and provided by national statistical
offices, treasuries, central banks or international organisations (IMF, OECD, and BIS).
We also employ liquidity and cross-border flows data at a global and national level from
CrossBorder Capital Ltd, a private data provider specialised in the monitoring of global
liquidity flows.
The dataset contains 16 US macro and financial indicators, including 5 macroeco-
nomic aggregates (industrial production index, CPI, core CPI, export-import ratio, and
trade volume), 5 financial indicators (stock price index, nominal effective exchange rate,
excess bond premium from Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012), 10-year Treasury Bond yield
rate, and VIX), and a monetary policy indicator (1-year Treasury constant maturity
rate). Additionally, we include 5 financial and liquidity indices from CrossBorder Cap-
ital Ltd – financial conditions, risk appetite, cross-border flows, fixed income and equity
holdings. The financial conditions index represents short-term credit spreads, such as
deposit-loan spreads. Risk appetite is based on the balance sheet exposure of all in-
vestors between equity and bonds. The cross-border flows index captures all financial
flows into a currency, including banking and all portfolio flows (bonds and equities). Fi-
nally, equity and fixed income holdings measure respectively holdings of listed equities
and both corporate and government fixed income assets.
The dataset also includes 15 global economic indicators: industrial production, CPI,
and stock price index of OECD countries, the differential between average short-term
9If the original series are collected at a daily frequency, we take the end-of-month value.
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Table 1: Country coverage
Advanced Estimation sample Emerging Estimation Sample
Australia 1990:01 - 2018:08 Brazil 1999:12 - 2018:09
Austria 1990:01 - 2018:09 Chile 1995:05 - 2013:11
Belgium 1990:01 - 2018:09 China 1994:08 - 2018:08
Canada 1990:01 - 2018:08 Colombia 2002:09 - 2018:09
Denmark 1999:10 - 2018:09 Czech Rep. 2000:04 - 2018:09
Finland 1990:01 - 2018:09 Hungary 1999:02 - 2018:09
France 1990:01 - 2018:09 India 1994:05 - 2018:04
Germany 1990:01 - 2018:09 Malaysia 1996:01 - 2017:12
Italy 1990:01 - 2018:09 Mexico 1998:11 - 2018:02
Japan 1997:10 - 2018:09 Philippines 1999:02 - 2018:02
Netherlands 1990:01 - 2018:09 Poland 2001:01 - 2018:09
Norway 1995:10 - 2018:09 Russia 1999:01 - 2018:06
Spain 1990:01 - 2018:09 South Africa 1990:01 - 2018:09
Sweden 2001:10 - 2018:09 Thailand 1999:01 - 2018:05
UK 1990:01 - 2018:08 Turkey 2000:06 - 2018:09
Notes: The table lists the advanced and emerging countries in our data set
and reports the estimation sample for the exercises in Sections 4 and 5. The
set of endogenous variables for the median AE and the median EME exercises
are different (see notes in Table A.2).
interest rate across 15 advanced economies in our dataset and the US, the global eco-
nomic activity index constructed by Kilian (2019), CRB commodity price index, the
global price of Brent crude oil, and 3 major currency exchange rates per USD – i.e.
Euro, Pound Sterling, and Japanese Yen.10,11 Finally, the dataset includes 5 world-
aggregated liquidity indexes from CrossBorder Capital Ltd, that are the counterparts
of US indices described above.12
At a national level, our dataset covers 30 economies – 15 advanced and 15 emerging
(see Table 1).13 For each country in our sample and the Euro Area, we collect 15
indicators – industrial production, CPI, core CPI, stock price index, export-import
ratio, trade volume, nominal bilateral exchange rate, short-term interest rate, policy
10Table A.7 in the online appendix lists the short-term rates used in construction of the interest rate
differential.
11Kilian (2019)’s index is the corrected and updated version of the global real economic activity
index originally proposed in Kilian (2009) and criticised in Hamilton (2019).
12Table A.1 in the online appendix lists all global aggregates and the US variables in our dataset
and details the sources, sample availability, and transformations.
13A comprehensive list of the countries and sample availability for each variable can be found in the
online appendix, Table A.3.
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rate, long-term interest rate, plus the five liquidity indices (financial conditions, risk
appetite, cross-border flows, fixed income and equity holdings). Hence, we have at our
disposal a set of variables that reflect the US counterparts for each economy.14
Our benchmark estimation sample generally spans January 1990 to September 2018
to minimise the impact of historical transformations of the global economy – e.g. the
end of the Soviet bloc, or the accession of China to the WTO – and also to align the
data with our US monetary policy instrument.15,16
In Section 7 we classify the countries in our dataset based on selected observables
– the degree of capital market openness, exchange rate regime, trade shares invoiced in
USD, and dollar exposure. We divide countries into more or less-open capital markets
based on Chinn and Ito (2006)’s index. We also provide a robustness check based on
the measure provided in Ferna´ndez et al. (2016a). Classification into pegging, managed
floating, and freely floating regimes is based on Ilzetzki et al. (2019). Data on the US
dollar trade invoicing is from Gopinath (2015). Our measure of dollar exposure is based
on Be´ne´trix et al. (2015).
2.2 Identification of the US Monetary Policy Shock
Recent literature on monetary policy shocks has documented the existence of a signalling
channel of monetary policy, i.e. the fact that policy actions convey to imperfectly in-
formed agents signals about macroeconomic developments (see Romer and Romer, 2000
and Melosi, 2017). Indeed, to informationally constrained agents a policy rate hike can
signal either a deviation of the central bank from its monetary policy rule, i.e. a contrac-
tionary monetary shock, or better-than-expected fundamentals to which the monetary
authority endogenously responds. Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2017) and Jarocin´ski
and Karadi (forthcoming) have shown that the high-frequency surprises obtained from
intraday price revisions of federal funds futures in tight windows around central bank
announcements combine policy shocks with information about the state of the economy
14Table A.2 in the online appendix lists variables we collect for each country and the US counterparts,
detailing the transformations.
15The estimation sample for the global exercise described in Section 3 spans 1990:01 to 2018:09.
However, given the different availability of data across countries, the estimation sample used in the
‘median economy’ exercises described in Sections 4 and 5 varies. Table 1 in the online appendix details
the estimation samples used in each bilateral system.
16All data sources are listed in the online appendix, in Tables A.1 and A.5.
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due to the information disclosed through the policy action (see Gu¨rkaynak et al., 2005
for the original high frequency methodology). Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2017) re-
lated these signalling effects of monetary policy to the emergence of the empirical price
and output puzzles reported in the literature (see for example, Ramey, 2016), and they
proposed a new high-frequency instrument for monetary policy shocks that accounts for
informational rigidities.
As observed by Bernanke (2017), the fact that monetary policy has strong sig-
nalling and coordination effects is a major challenge to the identification of international
spillovers of the Fed’s policy actions. An identification approach not disentangling mon-
etary policy shocks from signals about macroeconomic and financial conditions would
confound spillovers from US monetary policy and the effects of macroeconomic and
global shocks. Hence, apparently strong effects could reflect factors that drive the global
business and financial cycles – such as changes in risk appetite, oil shocks, trade shocks
and technology shocks. For this reason, we adopt the informationally robust instru-
ment proposed by Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2017) that directly controls for the
signalling channel of monetary policy.
This instrument is obtained in three steps. First, the high-frequency market-based
surprises in the fourth federal funds futures (FF4) around FOMC announcements of
Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005) are projected on Greenbook forecasts and forecast revisions for
real output growth, inflation (measured as the GDP deflator) and the unemployment
rate. The following regression is run at FOMC meeting frequency:
FF4m = α0 +
3∑
j=−1
θjF
cb
mxq+j +
2∑
j=−1
ϑj
[
F cbmxq+j − F cbm−1xq+j
]
+ MPIm. (1)
where FF4m denotes the high-frequency market-based monetary surprise computed
around the FOMC announcement indexed by m. F cbmxq+j denotes Greenbook forecasts
for the vector of variables x at horizon q + j that are assembled prior to each meeting,
and
[
F cbmxq+j − F cbm−1xq+j
]
denotes revisions to forecasts between consecutive FOMC
meetings. The forecast horizon is expressed in quarters, and q denotes the current
quarter. These forecasts are typically published a week prior to each scheduled FOMC
meeting and can be thought of as a proxy of the information set of the FOMC at the
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time of making the policy decision. For each surprise, the latest available forecast is
used.
Second, the monthly instrument MPI t is constructed by summing the daily MPIm
within each month. In the vast majority of cases, there is only one FOMC decision
per month; the monthly surprise simply equals the daily one in these cases. Similarly,
months without FOMC meetings are assigned a zero.
Finally, the autoregressive component in the monthly surprises is removed. Let
MPI t denote the result of the monthly aggregation described in the previous step.
Our monthly monetary policy instrument MPIt is constructed as the residuals of the
following regression:
MPI t = φ0 +
12∑
j=1
φjMPI t−j +MPIt . (2)
The intuition for the construction of this instrument is that the Greenbook forecasts
(and revisions) directly control for the information set of the central bank and hence
for the macroeconomic information transferred to the agents through the announcement
(the signalling channel of monetary policy). The removal of the autoregressive compon-
ents accounts for the slow absorption of information by the agents – a crucial implication
of models of imperfect information (see Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2015). This instru-
ment is available from January 1990 to December 2009. It is worth stressing that in the
SVAR-IV/Proxy-SVAR approach of Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens and Ravn
(2013), in which the proxy is employed as an external instrumental variable, the VAR
estimation sample needs not coincide with the sample over which the instrument is
available.
2.3 BVARs and Asymmetric Priors
In our analysis we consider two main empirical specifications:
• A US-global VAR incorporating 30 variables, including 15 global economic in-
dicators and 15 of the US macroeconomic indicators described above.17
17Table A.1 in the online appendix lists all global and the US variables in our dataset.
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• A battery of 31 US-foreign country bilateral VARs, each one containing 16
US macroeconomic variables, 15 financial and macroeconomic indicators of the
foreign economy, and two global controls, i.e. the global price of Brent crude oil
and Kilian (2019)’s global economic activity index. We do this for each one of the
30 countries considered plus the Euro Area.18
Specifically, we consider bilateral VAR models with 12 lags of the endogenous vari-
ables – in line with the standard macroeconometric practice for monthly data – of the
form:
Yit = ci +
p∑
j=1
AijYi,t−j + uit, p = 12 (3)
where i is the index of the unit of interest (the global economy, one of the 30 economies
considered or the Euro Area). The vector of endogenous variables, Yit, consists of the
macroeconomic and financial variables described in Section 2.1 (yi1:n,t), together with
the US counterparts (yUS1:n,t), and, for the country models, the global controls (x1:m,t):
Yit = [(y
i
1,t, . . . , y
i
n,t), (y
US
1,t , . . . , y
US
n,t ), x1,t, . . . , xm,t]
′ . (4)
It is important to stress that the adoption of large endogenous information sets in our
bilateral VAR models captures potentially rich economic dynamics at the country level,
the US and periphery’s positions in the business cycles, and the many potential channels
through which the US monetary policy can affect the rest of the world. Importantly,
global controls in the bilateral system allow for higher-order transmission channels in-
duced by interactions among countries, that are important in correctly capturing inter-
national spillovers (see discussion in Georgiadis, 2017).
The use of large information sets requires efficient big data techniques to estimate
the models. We adopt a Bayesian approach with informative Minnesota priors (Litter-
man, 1986). These are the most commonly adopted macroeconomic priors for VARs
and formalise the view that an independent random-walk model for each variable in
the system is a reasonable centre for the beliefs about their time series behaviour (see
Sims and Zha, 1998). While not motivated by economic theory, they are computation-
18Due to data availability, Core CPI, Fixed Income and Equity Holdings are used only in the endo-
genous set of advanced economies. Hence, the bilateral system of emerging economies includes only 12
domestic variables and 13 US variables.
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ally convenient priors, meant to capture commonly held beliefs about how economic
time series behave. It is worth stressing that in scientific data analyses, priors on the
model coefficients do not incorporate the investigator’s subjective beliefs: instead, they
summarise stylised representations of the data generating process.
In particular, in estimating the VAR models we elicit asymmetric Minnesota pri-
ors that assume the coefficients A1, . . . , Ap to be a priori independent and normally
distributed, with the following moments19
E [(A`)ij|Σ] =
δi i = j, ` = 10 otherwise Var [(A`)ij|Σ] =

λ21
f(`)
for i = j,∀`
χij
λ21
f(`)
Σij
ω2j
for i 6= j,∀`.
(5)
where (A`)ij denotes the coefficient of variable j in equation i at lag ` and δi is either 1 for
variables in levels or 0 for rates. The prior also assumes that lags of other variables are
less informative than own lags, and that most recent lags of a variable tend to be more
informative than distant lags. This intuition is embedded in the function f(`), that we
assume to be a harmonic lag decay – f(`) = `λ2 , for λ2 = 2. The factor Σij/ω
2
j accounts
for different scales of variables i and j. In our specification, the hyperparameters ω2j are
fixed using sample information, i.e. the variance of residuals from univariate regressions
of each variable onto its own lags. λ1 is a hyperparameter that controls the overall
tightness of the random walk prior.20
Taking one step further from the standard Minnesota priors, the hyperparameter χij
breaks the symmetry across the VAR equations and allows for looser or tighter priors for
some lags of selected regressors in a particular equation i. The adoption of asymmetric
priors complicates the estimation problem, as discussed in Carriero et al. (2019) and
Chan (2019), making it impossible to use dummy variables to implement the priors. We
19Tables A.1 and A.2 in the online appendix contain information about transformations and priors
of all the variables discussed above.
20If λ1 = 0, the prior information dominates, and the VAR shrinks to a vector of independent
random walks or white noise processes according to the prior we impose. Conversely, as λ1 → ∞, the
prior becomes less informative, and the posterior asymptotically only reflects sample information.
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employ the efficient methodology proposed in those papers to estimate our models.21
In our setting, the hyperparameter χij is crucially important, because it enables us
to rule out a direct response of some US variables to economic conditions in another
country. Specifically, in the US-global system, we set χij = 0 for all coefficients dir-
ectly connecting US indicators to major exchange rates, global liquidity and the OECD
variables. This rules out a direct response of US indicators to these variables, while
allowing the possibility of a direct response via the global economic activity, oil price,
and commodity price index. It reduces potential collinearity problems between OECD
aggregates and US counterparts, and among the exchange rates.22 In the bilateral sys-
tems, we impose that all coefficients directly connecting the US variables to periphery
country indicators are zero. However, global indicators allow for an indirect response via
higher-order effects (as proposed in Georgiadis, 2017). These restrictions are of great
importance in reducing parameter uncertainty and alleviating multicollinearity prob-
lems. This is particularly relevant in selectively studying the channels of transmission
of US policy shocks.
2.4 Estimation of Median-Group Responses
In several exercises we estimate median group dynamic responses for selected groups of
countries to US monetary policy shocks. The goal is to provide an indication about what
responses of a synthetic ‘median’ economy to the shock would look like. The underlying
groups of countries can be thought as being homogeneous along some specific structural
characteristics, such as the degree of capital market openness, the exchange rate regime,
or dollar exposure.
We estimate bilateral country VARs individually and obtain the median result across
countries, which we interpret as the median group estimator. While less efficient than
21Standard Minnesota priors are implemented as Normal-Inverse Wishart priors that force symmetry
across equations, because the coefficients of each equation are given the same prior variance matrix (up
to a scale factor given by the elements Σij). This implies that own lags and lags of other variables must
be treated symmetrically. Hence, it is not possible to cast the Minnesota prior in its original formulation
as presented in Litterman (1986), which imposes extra shrinkage on the cross-variable coefficients.
22Specifically, this assumption implies that all variables in the bottom half of Table A.1 in the online
appendix plus the last three variables of the top half (global economic activity, commodity price, and
oil price) do not respond endogenously to the remaining variables in the top half of the table. They are
however allowed to respond endogenously among themselves, so that global activity, commodity prices,
and oil price directly affect all US variables.
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the pooled estimator under dynamic homogeneity, it delivers consistent estimates of the
average dynamic effect of shocks if dynamic heterogeneity is present (see Canova and
Ciccarelli, 2013, for a discussion).23 Importantly, we opt for the median group estimator
instead of the mean group estimator in order to reduce the importance of outliers (e.g.
episodes of hyperinflation in some countries within the sample period).
In our empirical approach, the estimation of confidence bands for the parameters
of interest relies on the standard Gibbs sampling algorithm. For each bilateral VAR
model, we obtain s draws (after burn-in) from the conditional posterior distribution of
A, the companion matrix of equation 4 expressed in SUR form, and Σ, the corresponding
variance-covariance matrix, and compute the impulse response for each draw. Now we
have s impulse responses for each country, and the goal is to aggregate them into the
responses of the ‘median’ economy. We do this by taking sequentially each draw of
the impulse responses, starting with the first one, for each country and obtaining the
median response across countries at each horizon.24 Eventually, we are left with s draws
that can be interpreted as the response of the ‘median’ economy to the shock. The
aggregation algorithm is the following:
1. For each Gibbs sampler iteration, stack the impulse responses of all countries in
the group and compute the median across countries at each horizon.
2. Repeat the procedure for each iteration and store all median values obtained.
3. Sort these values and pick the median and corresponding bands at each horizon.
4. Repeat the above steps for all the variables in the endogenous set.25
23If we were willing to assume that the data generating process featured dynamic homogeneity across
countries (and to condition on the initial values of the endogenous variables), a pooled estimation with
fixed effects, capturing idiosyncratic but constant heterogeneities across units, would be the standard
approach to estimate the parameters of the model. However, in our setting dynamic heterogeneity
seems to be a likely property of the systems.
24This is equivalent to drawing without replacement a draw from the set of draws we have available
for each country, and taking at each horizon the median value across countries. We proceed sequentially
purely because of coding convenience.
25For US indicators and global controls, we do not obtain the median across bilateral country-pair
models, as we would be taking the median across several instances of the same country. We just stack
all IRFs coming from the various bilateral models.
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3 The Global Propagation of U.S. Monetary Policy
In this section we report the dynamic responses to conventional US monetary policy
shocks obtained by estimating the US-Global BVAR, described in Section 2.3. Follow-
ing the convention, we plot the responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock:
it is important to observe that since the system is linear, responses for expansionary
and contractionary shocks are symmetric. Results are obtained by employing the full
sample from January 1990 to September 2018 for the estimation of the VAR coefficients.
Impacts are identified via the instrument for conventional monetary policy shocks dis-
cussed in Section 2.2, that is available from January 1990 to December 2009. In each
plot, we report median responses, 68% and 90% posterior coverage bands.
The US indicators in the VAR system have been constrained by means of the asym-
metric priors to endogenously respond only to other US indicators and to a few proxies
of global economic conditions – the global economic activity index, the commodity price
index and the price of oil. The parameters of the equations of global variables are instead
left unconstrained. In other words, the system allows US variables to be endogenously
affected by the higher order response of the three proxies of global economic conditions –
sometimes referred to as ‘spillback’ effects – while global variables respond endogenously
to every other variable in the system. This alleviates some of the collinearity between
global aggregates and US counterparts and allows for more precise estimates of the re-
sponses. The US monetary policy shock is normalised to induce a 100bp increase in our
policy indicator, the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate. All the IRFs reported in
this section are jointly obtained in a large Bayesian VAR. We first assess the domestic
effects of monetary policy shocks on the US economy, and then their propagation to the
global economy.
3.1 Domestic Effects of U.S. Monetary Policy
Figure 1 reports the effects of a monetary policy tightening. The shock transmits along
the yield curve by moving the shorter maturities more than the long end of the curve,
as shown by the increase in the 10-year rates. The term spread decreases and the
the yield curve flattens down, while prices of risky financial assets (the S&P index)
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Figure 1: Domestic Effects of U.S. Monetary Policy Shocks
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Note: Domestic responses to a contractionary US monetary policy shock, normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase
in the 1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample 1990:01 – 2018:09. BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate
priors. Shaded areas are 68% and 90% posterior coverage bands.
strongly revise downwards. The policy hike affects both real and nominal quantities.
US industrial production and CPI sharply contract on impact to remain significantly
below equilibrium over a horizon of 24 months. Importantly, there is no trace of price
or output puzzles in the responses.
The interest rate movement induces an exchange rate appreciation of the US dollar
vis-a`-vis the other currencies, as is visible in the positive response of the nominal ef-
fective exchange rate. Despite the dollar appreciation, the monetary policy contraction
has an overall positive impact on the balance of trade and the exports-imports ratio
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improves. This happens through a compression of imports that adjust downwards more
than exports.26 The overall effect of the shock on trade is negative and traded volumes
contract. The demand-augmenting effect dominates the expenditure-switching effect:
lower domestic demand makes imports fall more than exports, despite the US goods
becoming more expensive.
The monetary tightening affects the financial system as is evident in the response
of the indicators of financial distress: Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012)’s excess bond
premium response soars on impact and remains above trend for roughly 10 months,
with the VIX showing similar dynamics. The financial conditions index – an index of
very short-term credit spreads, e.g. deposit loan spreads – also shows a deterioration in
credit conditions. The broad picture of these responses indicates activation of the credit
channel of monetary policy transmission (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).
Interestingly, risk appetite is reduced by the policy tightening (risk-off). This is also
visible in the response of equity holdings that fall significantly on impact while safe asset
holdings slightly increase, pointing to a portfolio rebalancing towards less-risky assets.27
Cross-border flows seem to indicate capital inflows on impact but the overall response
is not significant, possibly due to the movement of capital to US dollar denominated
assets held outside the US.
3.2 Global Spillovers
The global economy responds to US monetary policy tightenings by mirroring the eco-
nomic contraction in the US, albeit with a slight delay. This is visible in Figure 2, which
displays the IRFs of a set of global indicators to the contractionary US monetary policy
shock reported in Figure 1 (IRFs are obtained from the same BVAR model). The broad
picture is that there are strong spillovers from the US to the global economy to both
real and nominal variables. OECD industrial production and global economic activity
contract, with the trough of the former matching that of US output – around -2.5%.
26In the benchmark model, we only include the import/export ratio and traded volumes to avoid
collinearity problems. IRFs for imports and exports with a similar model are reported in Miranda-
Agrippino and Ricco (2017).
27This composite index obtained from CBC is computed as the difference between the equity expos-
ure index and the bond exposure index. The two indexes are based on the balance sheet exposure of
all investors by type in the relevant asset class.
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Figure 2: Global Effects of U.S. Monetary Policy Shocks
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Note: Global responses to a contractionary US monetary policy shock, normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in
the 1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample 1990:01 – 2018:09. BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors.
Shaded areas are 68% and 90% posterior coverage bands. These responses are estimated jointly to those reported in the
previous figure. The response of the policy indicator appears in both figures for readability.
OECD CPI declines, and the peak effect is of the same scale as its US counterpart –
around -0.5%. Commodity prices, especially oil price, also contract.
The US dollar appreciation is visible in the exchange rate against three of the major
currencies – the Euro, British Pound sterling, and Japanese Yen. The average interest
rate differential between 15 advanced economies and the US falls by 0.7 percentage
points on impact and does not revert for at least 18 months. This means that, on
average, non-US central banks raise their interest rates by roughly 30bp in response to a
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100bp movement in the US policy indicator. The contraction in the differential persists
for at least one year.
Global risk appetite falls, and equity holdings decrease in both the US and the
rest of the world, suggesting worldwide portfolio rebalancing towards safe assets (risk-
off). These adjustments lead to a global contraction in cross-border flows, inducing
outflows and immobilizing capital. The deterioration of global economic conditions
and portfolio rebalancing out of risky assets put downward pressure on foreign asset
prices, and the world’s stock markets revise downwards.28 Financial conditions tighten
on impact, pointing to an increase in short-term rate spreads and activation of the
financial channel.
The landscape view of the response of global economy to US monetary policy provides
a powerful image of the Fed as a global central bank. Interestingly, our results are
consistent with Rey (2013)’s ‘global financial cycle’ argument: the dynamics of stock
prices and other financial variables in the US and in the global economy appear to be
synchronised and financial conditions deteriorate. These responses are also compatible
with the risk-taking and credit channels of monetary policy (Bruno and Shin, 2015b): a
contractionary shock shrinks asset demand and increases risk premia. Financial spreads
increase, followed by a deterioration in financial and credit market conditions. A fall
in asset prices pushes financial intermediaries to de-leverage to meet their value-at-risk
constraints, and it further contracts the economy. Results in this section show that the
financial channel operates not only domestically but also globally. We further investigate
these mechanisms in the next sections by looking at advanced and emerging economies
separately.
3.3 Disentangling the Channels
To gauge the importance of the various channels at play in the international propagation
of the shock, we perform a counterfactual exercise (see, for example Ramey, 1993 and
Uribe and Yue, 2006) in which we shut down the feedback from specific endogenous
variables that are thought to capture some channels of interest. In particular, we would
28This index is a weighted average of stock prices in advanced economies excluding North America,
so the commonality with US stock prices is not mechanical.
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Figure 3: Channels of Transmission, Global economy
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Note: Lines correspond to impulse responses obtained with the baseline specification (solid red); assuming the Brent
crude and commodity prices do not react (solid black); exchange rates do not react (dashed black); financial conditions,
risk appetite, cross-border flows, the excess bond premium, and VIX do not react (dashed-dotted black). Shock is
normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. High-frequency identification. Sample 1990:01 –
2018:09. BVAR(12). Equity and fixed-income holdings are not in the endogenous set to avoid collinearity issues.
like to answer the following question: how would the response of a variable of interest,
e.g. CPI or industrial production in a foreign economy, differ if the U.S. monetary policy
did not have a direct effect on exchange rates, liquidity, or commodity prices?
We proceed by selectively zeroing out the transmission coefficients of estimated VAR
models variables of interest and comparing the resp ns of this modifi d system to
our pre-zeroing-out benchmark. This back-of-the-envelope exercise can give us a sense
of the relative importance of selected variables in the transmission of the shock.29
Specifically, we employ the VAR model estimated in this section and sequentially
shut down the following variables: (i) commodity and oil prices, (ii) nominal exchange
rates, and (iii) some of the financial variables (financial conditions, risk appetite, and
cross-border flows). This reveals the importance of commodity prices, the exchange rate
channel, and the financial channel.
Figure 3 reports the median responses (without bands) for our set of experiments on
the global economy.30 Two results stand out. First, OECD industrial production and
the stock price contract less and rebound more quickly when the endogenous responses
of financial conditions, risk appetite, and cross-border flows are shut. These results
suggest that the financial channel plays a significant role in global spillovers, following
29Results in this section are not to be interpreted as a policy exercise, since they are subject to
Lucas’ critique.
30A full set of responses can be found in the online appendix B.3.
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the deepening of financial integration that started in the 1990s.
Second, the response of CPI becomes immaterial when oil and commodity prices can-
not respond to the shock. It highlights that nominal contractionary effects are possibly
due to the response of oil and commodities and their importance in the headline inflation
basket. Once their effect is factored out, the upward pressure from the pass-through of
higher dollar prices and the downward pressure from weaker demand roughly balance
out. Finally, the role of three major exchange rates seems to be limited – they affect
CPI and the stock price marginally and only in the medium run. No responses of the
interest rate differential are qualitatively different relative to the baseline when we shut
down any of the transmission channels. It suggests that no channel is predominant in
explaining the transmission of U.S. policy shocks to the short-term rate spreads between
the US and other advanced economies.
There are two caveats to the analysis in this section. First, some of the variables
(for example, OECD indicators) mechanically capture the direct response of the US eco-
nomy. Second, results only hold for global aggregates: they can mask large heterogeneity
across countries in terms of cyclical positions, structural features, and financial market
conditions, all of which could be important determinants of differential sensitivity to the
shock. We further explore these dimensions in the next sections.
4 Transmission to Advanced Economies
We now focus on the effects of US monetary policy on advanced economies. In doing so,
we study the responses to a US tightening obtained in a set of US-periphery bilateral
VARs that include one of the advanced economies at the time. We estimate these
bilateral systems for all 15 advanced economies in our sample (see Table 1 for a list
of the countries included in our analysis). In these models, the asymmetric priors rule
out a direct response of US variables to economic conditions in a periphery country,
while spill-back effects via the global variables are still allowed. We present median
IRFs, aggregated across countries, to a contractionary monetary policy shock.31 The US
monetary policy shock is normalised to induce a 100bp increase in our policy indicator,
31The IV used for identification of the MP shock and the methodology used for the aggregation of
IRFs into the responses of the median advanced economy are discussed in Section 2.2.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses of the median advanced economy
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Note: Median responses of 15 advanced economies to a contractionary US monetary policy shock, normalised to induce
a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample reported in Table 1. BVAR(12) with
asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded areas are 68% and 90% posterior coverage bands.
the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate. Importantly, since the system is linear,
responses to expansionary and contractionary shocks are symmetric.
4.1 Median Responses of Advanced Economies
Figure 4 displays the impulse responses of the median advanced economy. Following
a contractionary MP shock in the US, the currency of the median advanced economy
depreciates. The demand-reducing effect from the US offsets the expenditure-switching
effect: the overall trade volume drops while the export-import ratio does not change
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significantly.
The US policy shock transmits to both real and nominal variables in the median
advanced economy. There is a sharp decline in domestic industrial production, accom-
panied by a very persistent drop in CPI. Core CPI also falls, though it is only significant
at the 68% level. The policy rate rate does not move on impact but subsequently eases
for around 6 months. This is compatible with policy easing of a central bank responding
to deteriorating internal conditions and following the Taylor rule. The easing is trans-
mitted to the short-term interest rate, while the the long-term rate moves up, inducing
a steepening of the yield curve. This indicates that movements in risk premia impair the
transmission of the policy change to the long-end of the yield-curve, and hence to the
economy (a similar disconnect but between short rates and monetary policy rates for
emerging economies has been reported by Kalemli-O¨zcan, 2019). Indeed, the economic
contraction is sizeable but smaller than the one suffered by the global and the US eco-
nomies (-2.5% in industrial production and -0.5% in CPI). Notably, flexible exchange
rates and policy easing partially insulate the advanced economy, yet the US monetary
shock contracts output in the median advanced country. Cross-border flows indicate
outflows while financial conditions and risk appetite deteriorate, and investors switch
their portfolios from risky to safe assets. This suggests both a portfolio rebalancing
across assets and a risk-rebalancing across countries.
At the country level, responses are fairly homogeneous and do not show the degree of
heterogeneity previously reported. This provides robustness to our results and justifies
the choice of pooling across advanced economies to present median estimated IRFs.
Figure 5 shows the response of CPI to a contractionary US MP shock for 15 countries in
our sample.32 CPI is contracting for at least 11 out of 15 economies and the responses of
the remaining countries are either not significant or marginally significant. Interestingly,
Australia and Norway are commodities exporters.
Financial variables also respond in a strongly homogeneous way across countries.
Stock prices (online appendix B.5) contract in all 15 countries, and the long-term gov-
ernment bond yields (online appendix B.6) shift upwards for all except Belgium and
Spain. Cross-border flows (online appendix B.7) dry up with only few exceptions:
32These are the IRFs that we obtain from the bilateral models. In other words, each country’s
subplot comes out of a model that includes only the US and country itself.
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Figure 5: Response of CPI in Advanced Economies
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Note: Responses of CPI in 15 advanced economies to a contractionary US monetary policy shock, normalised to induce
a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample reported in Table 1. BVAR(12) with
asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded areas are 68% and 90% posterior coverage bands.
France, Germany, Sweden, and UK. All financial variables display identical dynamics
with both the US and the global economy – we read these results as a strong indication
of credit-channel effects from the global financial cycle.
In sum, a contractionary US monetary policy shock leads to a recession in advanced
economies. The financial channel seems to play a significant role in the transmission,
given strong co-movements of financial variables with the US counterparts. As the global
financial cycle negatively affects financial conditions, cross-border flows, and asset prices,
the developed world suffers from credit shortages and the resulting contraction of the
real economy. Traditional trade channels do not change the outcome substantially, as
price and demand effects seem to offset each other. Central banks attempt to counteract
the recessionary pressure by lowering interest rates marginally, but they tend to fail in
their price stabilisation mandates: prices do not revert for at least 18 months.
27
Figure 6: Channels of Transmission, Advanced economies
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Note: Lines correspond to impulse responses obtained with the baseline specification (solid red); assuming the policy rate
does not react (solid black); the Brent crude and commodity prices do not react (dashed black); exchange rates do not
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4.2 Disentangling the Channels
We further assess the importance of various transmission channels at play by selectively
zeroing out the coefficients of some of the variables of interest in the estimated models,
as done in the previous section. Along with the three sets of variables we examined in
the global case – commodity and oil prices, exchange rates, and all financial variables –
we also shut down the policy rate of advanced economies, as it is informative about the
reaction of the monetary authority. This allows to assess the relative importance of the
policy response, commodity prices, the exchange rate channel, and the financial channel
in the transmission of the US monetary policy shock.
Figure 6 shows the median responses (without bands) for our set of experiments on 15
advanced economies.33 Interestingly, as in the global economy case, industrial produc-
tion and stock prices revert to equilibrium quickly and overshoot when the transmission
via variables proxying for the financial channel – i.e. financial conditions, risk appetite,
and cross-border flows – is shut. Conversely, headline CPI shows a mild contraction
when oil and commodity prices are not allowed to propagate the shock. Interestingly,
core CPI, which does not contain energy prices, shows a mild and not significant re-
33A full set of responses can be found in Figure B.10, in the online appendix.
28
sponse with weaker dependence on commodity prices. The response of core CPI is
largely explained by the financial variables and hence correlates with the output con-
traction. Absent that, there is an expansion of core prices possibly due to pass-through
effects.
Financial variables and cross-border flows seem to be key in the transmission of the
US shock to the stock market and real economy. Oil and commodity prices provide
deflationary pressures on headline prices in advanced economies. The effects of central
bank actions and exchange rates appear to be relatively small, possibly due to the
movements in risk premia discussed above. The broad picture seems to indicate that
the transmission of the US monetary policy shock activates financial channels that limit
the action of central banks in advanced economies. However, the overall effect of the
financial channel is mild and monetary policy can still operate via traditional inflation
targeting and by easing economic conditions in response to adverse external shocks –
this would correspond to the case of intermediate financial spillovers, in the classification
proposed by Gourinchas (2018).
5 Transmission to Emerging Economies
Since the wave of financial crises in the emerging markets in the late 1990s there has
been a step change in macroeconomic policy, with most central banks embracing floating
exchange rates, the build up of large foreign exchange reserves, and a shift in govern-
ment borrowing from foreign to national currencies.34 Despite an improved resilience to
external shocks, emerging markets are still thought to be more vulnerable to US mon-
etary policy spillovers and deterioration of global financial conditions (see for example
Carstens and Shin, 2019).
In this section, we try to provide an empirical assessment of the vulnerability of
emerging markets to changes in US monetary policy. Emerging, developing and frontier
economies are potentially a largely heterogeneous set of countries. Indeed, they can
differ along several dimensions such as the monetary policy framework adopted, the
34Emerging economies in our analysis have less flexible exchange rate regimes than the AEs. None
of our EMEs is classified as a pure floater according to the classification of Ilzetzki et al. (2019) – we
treat Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as floaters, since their currencies are anchored to the Euro.
However, very few of them have hard pegs. We discuss this dimension in detail in Section 7.
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dependence on dollar denominated funds, the degree of invoicing in dollars, the size of
their internal markets, and the degree of openness to capital flows. We explore these
dimensions in steps. First, in this section, we discuss median responses to US monetary
policy actions and contrast them with the advanced economies. As in the previous sec-
tion, we present median IRFs, aggregated across countries, to a contractionary monetary
policy shock. We also provide a first assessment of responses at a country level. Then
in Section 6 we look at some of the largest emerging markets that are likely to display
very different policy frameworks, and contrast them to the Euro Area. Finally, in Sec-
tion 7 we look at the role of different policy regimes by grouping countries by their (i)
degree of capital market openness and (ii) exchange rate regimes. Our online appendix
reports additional exercises along other structural dimensions such as (iii) dollar trade
invoicing and (iv) dollar gross exposure. It is important to stress that in this section
and in the following two, since the system is linear, estimated responses to expansionary
and contractionary shocks are symmetric. Bear in mind that when studying EMEs the
quality and reliability of data may be a serious concern. In the light of this observation
the use of a relatively recent sample and the median response is helpful in averaging out
and alleviating potential data issues.
5.1 Median Responses of Emerging Economies
In the wake of an unexpected tightening of the US monetary policy stance, the economy
of the median emerging country contracts, as shown in Figure 7. The national cur-
rency depreciates, indicating that the median emerging economy was adopting flexible
exchange rates in the time-sample of interest. Yet, movement in the exchange rate is not
enough to insulate the economy from strong spillover effects. The expenditure-switching
channel is largely dominated by the other channels – demand and financial – and output,
prices, and the stock market contract.
Interestingly, the effect of higher prices of imports is dominated by the contraction
in demand and possibly subdued commodity prices. Headline inflation responds negat-
ively, immediately, and sharply. The trough response of output in the median emerging
economy is around -2.5% and in line with the US economy, while prices react even more
strongly than in the US, with a very persistent drop of 1%. It is worth noticing that sev-
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Figure 7: Median Response of Emerging Economies
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Note: Median responses of 15 emerging economies to a contractionary US monetary policy shock, normalised to induce
a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample reported in Table 1. BVAR(12) with
asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded areas are 68% and 90% posterior coverage bands.
eral countries in this sample are commodity exporters, and hence in aggregate the joint
effect of lower commodity prices and lower aggregated demand puts downward pressure
on the economy. These results are consistent with the findings in the literature, e.g.
Mackowiak (2007) and Iacoviello and Navarro (2018), that emerging markets are more
vulnerable to external shocks.
The joint contraction of output and prices, in line with the effect of a large demand
shock, allows the central bank to lower its policy rate – potentially putting more down-
ward pressure on the domestic currency. Yet, the policy easing is marginally transmitted
to short rates but not long rates, suggesting that risk premia are limiting the effective-
ness of the policy action. This evidence chimes with Kalemli-O¨zcan (2019), who argues
that capital flows in and out of EMEs are sensitive to fluctuations in global investors’
risk perceptions, induced by changes in the US monetary policy.
Financial conditions and risk appetite deteriorate, while the stock market contracts.
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Figure 8: Response of CPI in Emerging Economies
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Note: Responses of CPI in 15 emerging economies to a contractionary US monetary policy shock, normalised to induce
a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample reported in Table 1. BVAR(12) with
asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded areas are 68% and 90% posterior coverage bands.
The response of cross-border flows indicates capital outflows, although this is not signi-
ficant in the aggregate.35 Importantly, exchange-rate and interest-rate changes move in
the same direction: the currency depreciates against the dollar, while long-term yields
rise and bond prices fall. This co-movement suggests that sovereign bonds have higher
durations in dollar terms than in local currency terms, and hence are riskier to interna-
tional investors (see discussion in Carstens and Shin, 2019).
Unlike the case of advanced economies, the median responses mask a larger degree
of heterogeneity in some of the key variables. The response of CPI to a contractionary
shock induces a price decline for 11 out of 15 economies (see Figure 8). Responses of
Brazil, Mexico, Philippines, and Turkey are not significant at any levels. Industrial
production generally shrinks, and stock prices tumble in all countries except Brazil and
Malaysia (Figure B.11, in the online appendix). Interestingly, exchange rates, interest
rates and cross-border flows show heterogeneity across countries. Long-term government
35In general, emerging economies in our analysis have stricter capital controls than the advanced
ones. The median value of Chinn-Ito index for AEs is 0.965, while it is only 0.338 for EMEs. It roughly
indicates that the degree of openness to capital for the former is above top 5% in the world, while
the latter is only 34%. Table A.8 in the online appendix reports average values of the index for all
countries.
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Figure 9: Channels of Propagation
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Note: Lines correspond to impulse responses obtained with the baseline specification (solid red); assuming the policy rate
do not react (solid black); the Brent crude and commodity prices do not react (dashed black); exchange rates do not
react (dashed-dotted black); financial conditions, risk appetite, cross-border flows , the excess bond premium and VIX
do not react (dotted black). Shock is normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. High-frequency
identification. Sample reported in Table 1. BVAR(12).
bond yields tend to move upwards, but responses are not significant in some cases (Figure
B.12, in the online appendix). Cross-border flows are rather heterogeneous and country-
specific risks seem to play a role among EMEs (Figure B.13, in the online appendix).
To disentangle the role of various transmission channels, we repeat the ‘zeroing-out’
experiment for the median EME. As with the AEs, we study the channels of transmis-
sions of the US monetary policy shock by selectively zeroing-out the cross-coefficients of
key variables: the policy rate, commodity and oil prices, exchange rates, and all finan-
cial variables. This provides evidence on the relative importance of the central bank’s
policy reaction, commodity prices, the exchange rate channel, and the financial channel
in the transmission of the US shock.36 While not in contradiction with what we found
for AEs, the counterfactual results reveal a limited differential role for each group of
variables (Figure 9).37 Output still bounces back more when the financial variables do
not react, but now it happens only after 9 months. Shutting down oil and commodity
prices reduces the extent of the fall in headline inflation, but only marginally. No chan-
nel seems to be predominant in the transmission to stock prices. Our interpretation
36As discussed in section 3.3, we use the estimated coefficients on the model presented in this section,
but set all coefficients on variables of interest in all equations to zero, including their impact responses.
37The full set of responses can be found in the online appendix, Figure B.14.
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is that the shock transmits rather evenly across the economy and different groups of
variables capture similar mechanisms (or are rather ineffective, as the policy stance). It
is worth observing that several of our economies are commodity exporters: hence, ef-
fects on price, production, and the stock market are likely to be transmitted via several
variables in a similar way.
To summarise, emerging markets contract in response to a US monetary tightening.
Stock prices, exchange rate, financial conditions, and risk appetite strongly co-move in
the US, advanced, and emerging economies. Spillover effects are stronger for EMEs
than AEs, with trough responses now almost one-to-one-with the US counterparts. As
for advanced economies, prices fall in the median responses and across most of the
EMEs in our sample. It suggests that the increase in imported prices is dominated by
recessionary pressures at home. At least in the median country, as in the case of AEs,
the overall effect of the financial channel is modest and monetary policy can operate
by easing economic conditions in response to adverse external shocks (see discussion in
Gourinchas, 2018). Importantly, responses of cross-border flows, policy rates, interest
rates, and exchange rates are more heterogeneous than for AEs. This reflects more
diverse structural characteristics, policy regimes, and the role of country-specific risks
among EMEs. In the following sections, we explore some of these features.
6 Transmission to the Euro Area and Major EMEs
Are different policy regimes responsible for the heterogeneity we observe in the responses
presented in the previous section? As a first step to test this hypothesis, we focus on
the responses of some of the largest emerging economies with different policy regimes
– Mexico, China, and India – and benchmark them against the Euro Area, a large
economy with a flexible exchange rate and open capital markets. This exercise is helpful
in analysing three different policy regimes: open capital markets and a floating rate
(Mexico), closed capital markets and a crawling exchange rate (India), closed capital
markets and a pegged exchange rate (China).
Figure 10 displays the responses of Euro Area aggregates to a contractionary US
monetary policy shock. Similarly to the median advanced and emerging economies, the
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Figure 10: Euro Area
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Note: Responses of Euro Area to a contractionary US monetary policy shock, normalised to induce a 100 basis point
increase in the 1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample 1999:01 – 2018:09. BVAR(12) with asymmetric
conjugate priors. Shaded areas are 68% and 90% posterior coverage bands.
Euro Area also suffers recessionary effects. Output, prices, and the stock market all
contract. Trade volume drops by more than in the US at the trough, and the export-
import ratio also falls, indicating the prominence of the demand-reducing effect over the
expenditure-switching one. The ECB’s policy rate responds to deteriorating internal
conditions consistently with a Taylor rule and the easing is transmitted through the
yield curve to longer maturities. The role of risk premia is marginally visible at longer
horizons in the response of the long-term rate. The policy easing improves financial
conditions, but it is not enough to stabilise the economy: CPI does not fully revert at
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all horizons. Capital outflows and devaluation of equities are more severe for the EA
than the median AE. The negative responses in capital flows, risk appetite, and equity
holdings not only co-move but also display the same dynamics of the global economy.
Overall, results suggest that the Euro Area experiences a substantial decline in economic
activity due to reduced foreign demand and deteriorating internal conditions.
Now we focus on the responses of three major EMEs – Mexico, China, and India.
Mexico is a managed floater and has one of the most flexible exchange rate regimes
among EMEs, according to the classification of Ilzetzki et al. (2019). On average, across
the sample, its Chinn-Ito index puts the country among the top third economies in terms
of capital mobility. It is the most open capital market among non-European EMEs in
our sample.38 China on average employs a pre-announced crawling peg with strictly
controlled capital markets and it has close ties to the US market in terms of trade and
finance. In India, capital controls are as restrictive as in China, but the exchange rate
regime is more flexible. India is relatively less connected to the US economy than the
former two.39
Figure 11 shows the response of Mexico to a US tightening. As the Peso depreciates,
Mexico’s policy rate, followed by the short-term rate, rises. This is consistent with the
‘fear of floating’ argument: the Bank of Mexico is trying to shield its economy from
excessive capital outflows. It appears successful: cross-border flows are steady and the
contraction in risk appetite is short-lived. Financial conditions remain fairly stable as
the monetary policy tightening contains credit spreads. However, with financial stability
comes the cost of pushing the domestic economy into a recession: industrial production
and stock prices contract. The response of headline inflation is insignificant, suggesting
that the downward pressure on prices coming from the internal deflation offsets the
upward pressure coming from the exchange rate pass-through. Mexico, similarly to the
Euro Area, experiences a decline in exports due to lower foreign demand. Yet the very
stark policy response is indicative of the extent to which the exposure to the US and to
38Table A.8 in the online appendix reports the degree of openness to capital for the countries in our
sample.
39Ilzetzki et al. (2019) classifies both China and India as crawling peggers: their sample median
values are 5 and 7, respectively. The sample average value of the Chinn and Ito (2006) index is 0.166
for both countries. Though roughly 86% of India’s exports and imports are invoiced in dollars, its gross
dollar exposure is the second lowest among our sample of 15 EMEs. Gopinath (2015) and Be´ne´trix et
al. (2015) for details.
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Figure 11: Mexico
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Note: Responses of Mexico to a contractionary US monetary policy shock, normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase
in the 1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample 1998:11 – 2018:02. BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors.
Shaded areas are 68% and 90% posterior coverage bands.
capital flows limits the policy space of the central bank.
Next, we report China’s responses in Figure 12. Consistently with the crawling peg
adopted by the People’s Bank of China (PBC), the exchange rate depreciates slowly
and only slightly. Noticeably, it does not revert at all horizons, suggesting a potential
‘fear of appreciation’ due to concerns about the trade balance. The policy rate shows a
loosening of the policy stance that is transmitted through the yield curve. In the absence
of open capital markets, the policy stance is fully effective. However, cross-border flows
denote an outflow of capital from China – potentially reflecting unsterilised market
interventions from the PBC. The policy response insulates the economy: contraction
in output is short-lived and followed by some expansion possibly due to the combined
internal easing and the currency devaluation. Stock prices do not react on impact. Yet
risk appetite and financial conditions deteriorate. Prices decline significantly on impact
and remain below trend for over 16 months.
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Figure 12: China
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Note: Responses of China to a contractionary US monetary policy shock, normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase
in the 1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample 1994:08 – 2018:08. BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate
priors. Shaded areas are 68% and 90% posterior coverage bands.
Finally, in India policy spillovers to a contractionary US shock are limited (see Figure
13): industrial production, CPI and the stock market do not react significantly to the
shock at any horizons. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) loosens its monetary policy
stance and cross-border flows remain stable. The lack of movement in capital flows may
not be surprising, since India strictly controls its capital market. The policy loosening
transmits to short and long rates. The exchange rate first depreciates but quickly reverts
to equilibrium. Trade volume contracts significantly, but the overall effect on output
seems to be offset by an increasing internal demand, driven by the policy stimulus.
India seems to be able to set an autonomous monetary policy and fully sterilise the
shock. This result suggests that other structural dimensions might also play a role
in the transmission of the US shock: for instance, India’s gross dollar exposure is the
second lowest among our sample of EMEs, according to Be´ne´trix et al. (2015). Thanks
to a modest economic and financial integration between its economy and the US, the
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Figure 13: India
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Note: Responses of India to a contractionary US monetary policy shock, normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in
the 1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample 1994:05 – 2018:04. BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors.
Shaded areas are 68% and 90% posterior coverage bands.
RBI might be facing a weaker trade-off compared to Mexico and China.
Our country-level analyses provide evidence of the role of different policy regimes
in the transmission of the shock. Spillover effects are more severe in a relatively open
capital market (Mexico) than in more closed ones (China and India). Differences in
responses of the latter two EMEs point out that other dimensions, e.g. gross dollar
exposure and trade linkages, might also play an important role.
7 Capital Controls and FX regimes
In this section, we further explore the role of different policy regimes by grouping coun-
tries by their (i) degree of openness to capital and (ii) exchange rate regimes, the two
key dimensions of the classical trilemma. First, we compare open to less-open capital
markets by grouping them on the basis of Chinn and Ito (2006)’s index and by studying
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Figure 14: Advanced Economies with more v. less Openness to Capital
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Note: Orange line – median responses of 5 AEs (Canada, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, and UK), whose overall
capital restriction corresponds to the bottom 1/3 among 15 advanced economies. Dotted blue line – median responses
of 6 AEs (Australia, France, Italy, Norway, Spain, and Sweden), whose overall capital restriction corresponds to the top
1/3. Data on capital restrictions are from the Chinn-Ito index. Shock is normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase
in the 1-year rate. BVAR (12). Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
advanced and emerging markets separately.40 Then, we compare median responses of
relative peggers, managed floaters, and free floaters by adopting the classification of
Ilzetzki et al. (2019). We also briefly discuss the role of dollar trade invoicing and gross
dollar exposure in the transmission of US monetary policy.
In Figure 14, we report the median responses of AEs with more and less openness
to capital, based on the Chinn-Ito index, which measures the degree of de jure capital
market openness of a country. To construct open and less-open country groups, we
calculate the arithmetic average of the Chinn-Ito index over the sample period for each
country.41 Then, we classify countries in the top tercile as more open capital markets
and countries in the bottom tercile as less open ones. The group of more open capital
markets consists of 5 AEs: Canada, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands and the UK;
while the relatively less open markets are Australia, France, Italy, Norway, Spain, and
40Pooling all countries and constructing groups based on average values of Chinn and Ito (2006)’s
index would simply return the division between AEs and EMEs.
41We use the ka open index, which is a continuous measure and ranges between 0 and 1. The higher
the number is, the more open a country’s capital market is.
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Figure 15: Emerging Economies with more v. less Openness to Capital
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Note: Orange line – median responses of 5 EMEs (Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, and Poland), whose overall
capital restriction corresponds to the bottom 1/3 among 15 advanced economies. Dotted blue line – median responses
of 5 EMEs (Brazil, India, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey), whose overall capital restriction corresponds to the top
1/3. Data on capital restrictions are from the Chinn-Ito index. Shock is normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase
in the 1-year rate. BVAR (12). Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
Sweden.42 Importantly, all countries in both groups adopt a flexible exchange rate regime
during our sample period, 1990 – 2018. We obtain median responses of each group by
aggregating the IRFs from the countries’ bilateral models as described in Section 2.4.
Figure 14 shows that spillover effects from the US are relatively stronger for econom-
ies that have more open capital markets. Responses of output and CPI are (marginally)
more negative, significant, and persistent if the capital markets are more globally in-
tegrated. Responses of other variables are mostly identical: co-movements among stock
prices, exchange rates, and the risk-appetite are in line with results shown in the previ-
ous sections. It is important to stress that all the AEs have a high degree of openness
to capital, so the difference between the two groups is only marginal.43
Next, we compare the median responses of EMEs with more and less openness to
capital. Focusing on EMEs is more informative about the role of capital openness since
countries are more heterogeneous in this respect. Indeed, the difference between the two
groups is now significantly larger: the average value of the Chinn-Ito index for more and
42Table A.8 in the online appendix contains more information about the classification.
43The average value of the Chinn-Ito index for more and less open AEs is 0.998 and 0.897 respectively.
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less open EMEs is 0.469 and 0.354 respectively.44 Chile, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Mexico, and Poland have more open capital markets, while Brazil, India, South Africa,
Thailand, and Turkey have relatively closed capital markets.45 Importantly, the two
groups do not only differ in terms of capital openness but also in terms other structural
features: for example, we find a prevalence of floaters among more open markets and a
prevalence of peggers among less open ones.
Differences in spillover effects between EMEs with open and closed capital markets
are stark (see Figure 15). Output turns significantly negative for the open markets and
the median response stays below trend for almost two years. The output response of less
open countries, however, is mostly not significant and reverts quickly. CPI responses of
the two groups overlap for 6 months, but only open markets experience a significant fall
afterwards. Importantly, cross-border flows contract on impact for more open markets,
while they are mostly unresponsive for the other group. Also, even though the nominal
exchange rate depreciates for both groups, it depreciates more for the open markets.
Responses of cross-border flows and the exchange rates validate our classification. Fi-
nally, we find almost no difference in the responses of stock prices, policy rates, and risk
appetite.
To explore the role of exchange rate regimes, we classify countries into three dif-
ferent groups: (i) floaters, (ii) managed floaters, and (iii) crawling peggers. We assign
each country to the regime corresponding to its sample median value of Ilzetzki et al.
(2019)’s classification.46 In our sample, there are 17 floaters (all AEs except Canada,
plus the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland), 6 managed floaters (Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and South Africa), and 4 crawling peggers (China, India, the
Philippines, and Thailand). As before, we obtain median group responses by aggregat-
ing IRFs from the countries’ bilateral models. Note that unlike the previous exercise on
capital controls, here we use all 30 countries in our sample.
44To classify countries, we follow the same approach as the AEs – i.e. we take countries whose
sample average of the Chinn-Ito index falls into the top and bottom tercile as more and less open
capital markets respectively.
45Table A.8 in the online appendix provides additional details.
46We use Ilzetzki et al. (2019)’s ‘fine’ classification to construct the three exchange rate regimes. If
a country’s sample median value of the index is 14, we treat it as a floater. If the value is 12, it is
classified as the managed floater. All values below 12 fall into the crawling peg category. Table A.9 in
the online appendix contains more information about our criteria.
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Figure 16: Exchange rate regimes
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Note: Orange line – median responses of 17 floaters (15 advanced economies except Canada, plus Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland), Dotted blue line – median responses of 6 managed floaters (Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, and South Africa), Green dash-dotted line – median responses of 4 crawling peggers (China, India, Philippines,
and Thailand). Data on exchange rate regimes are from Ilzetzki et al. (2019). Shock is normalised to induce a 100 basis
point increase in the 1-year rate. BVAR (12). Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
We compare the median responses of the three different exchange rate groups in
Figure 16. First, the exchange rate response validates our classification: it depreciates
for the first two groups but does not react for the crawling pegs. A stronger depreciation
in the managed float group as compared to the free floaters further corroborates our
sample composition. Indeed, managed floaters consist of EMEs, while the majority
of free floaters are AEs. Second, the US monetary policy spillover affects all regimes –
output, CPI, stock prices, and risk appetite contract in all three groups, but recessionary
effects are minimal for the floaters. Crawling peggers seem to suffer the most severe
deflation by fully importing the US monetary policy shock. The trough response of
output is also the strongest for peggers, although bands are large. The policy response
reveals that while floaters (marginally) and peggers (strongly) loosen their policy rates,
the managed floaters have to hike them, possibly to avoid capital outflows. This group
is indeed formed by countries that combine managed but flexible exchange rates with
relatively more open capital markets. Interestingly, the policy rate seems to stabilise
capital flows: cross-border flows remain steady for this group. Conversely, floaters
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experience significant capital outflows in the absence of the capital controls that shield
the peggers.
We conclude this section by conducting two other group analyses based on other
measures that are closely related to the exchange rate regime: (i) share of trade invoiced
in dollars and (ii) gross dollar exposure. We use data from Gopinath (2015) to classify
countries between high and low dollar trade invoicing. We follow Be´ne´trix et al. (2015)
to divide countries between high and low exposure to the dollar.47 Here we focus on
EMEs, as this is an important dimension for those economies only. As we did for the
degree of capital openness, we select countries that are in the top and bottom tercile
in terms of the sample average of the two measures, then we compare their median
responses.48 Figures B.15 and B.16 in the online appendix echo our results in Figure
16: countries with a high degree of dollar trade invoicing/gross dollar exposure display
responses that are similar to those of crawling peggers, while economies that are less
dependent on the dollar behave similarly to managed floaters. Finally, we conduct a
robustness check on capital controls by using a different index, constructed by Ferna´ndez
et al. (2016b). Results in Figure B.17 in the online appendix are consistent with those
in Figure 15 reported above.
To summarise, our results suggest that the degree of openness to capital flows and
the exchange rate regime are two important dimensions for understanding the global
transmission of US monetary policy. The responses of industrial production and CPI are
stronger and more negative for economies that have more open capital markets. Neither
flexible nor the ‘middle-ground’ exchange rate regimes can fully insulate economies from
US monetary policy shocks that transmit through both financial and classic channels.
Importantly, different policy dimensions and country characteristics – exchange rate
regime, openness of capital markets, dollar trade invoicing, and gross dollar exposure –
appear to be related, and the choice of the regime might be endogenous and determined
by country-specific deeper structural features.
47Gopinath (2015) reports the fraction of a country’s exports/imports invoiced in a foreign currency.
We construct a measure of gross dollar exposure for each country by taking the sum of USD total assets
and liabilities as a percentage of GDP from the dataset of Be´ne´trix et al. (2015).
48See Tables A.10 and A.11 in the online appendix for details about the classifications.
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8 Asymmetric Effects of US Monetary Policy Shocks
A question that has important policy implications is whether there are asymmetries in
the transmission of contractionary and expansionary monetary policy shocks. In the
case of US monetary loosenings, financial conditions in third countries ease and capital
flows into local bonds and risky assets. When these favourable conditions are reversed
abruptly, the foreign economy may be exposed to rapid capital outflows with powerful
destabilising effects. Such a mechanism may induce ‘fear of floating’, asymmetries in the
policy response of foreign monetary authorities to positive and negative US monetary
policy shocks, and foreign exchange market interventions to avoid sudden and large
depreciations of the currency.
A different argument recently advanced is that when a peripheral country has positive
net assets denominated in dollars, a loosening in the US causes the local currency to
appreciate vis-a`-vis the dollar, making the value of foreign assets fall. The total wealth
in the economy shrinks, potentially leading to a contraction in local consumption and
investment. This mechanism – often mentioned with reference to China – would explain
why we might observe asymmetric responses such as ‘fear of appreciation’ (see discussion
in Georgiadis and Mehl, 2016; Han and Wei, 2018).
While these narratives may match the pattern of some crises in the emerging mar-
kets and popularly reported facts, the empirical evidence is still relatively thin. This
section provides novel evidence about asymmetry in the macroeconomic responses to
US monetary policy tightenings and loosenings.
We proceed in two steps. First, we divide our monetary policy instrument into
positive (tightening) and negative (loosening) parts. Then we identify the shock in the
models presented in the above sections using these two different external instruments.
We run this exercise for the US, at the global level, and for advanced and emerging
economies. This amounts to assuming that while the system is still linear, tightenings
and loosenings are two different types of shock with distinct transmissions.49 For ease
49This has to be seen as a reduced form stylised way to gauge the extent of the different impacts of
tightenings and loosenings while maintaining large information sets. Alternatively, one could explore
the same effects using a Local Projections approach. However, the gain in flexibility in the IRFs could
be offset by the increase in the uncertainty of the estimates and the reduction in data points used for
the estimation.
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of comparison, we flip the loosening response and normalise both shocks to induce a
100 basis point increase in the US 1-year rate. Hence, for instance, a negative response
of US production to the loosening shock in the chart means that the actual response is
expansionary.
A note of caution is needed here. An important part of our analysis concerns emer-
ging markets. Yet, in looking at emerging countries and splitting the sample of our IV,
data issues are likely to be amplified and a few episodes in a few countries can end up
driving the results. To mitigate this issue, we narrow the cross-section of countries and
extend the sample by dropping variables for which the time series were shorter. This
allows us to include the monetary tightening episodes of the 1990s (and their effects) in
our estimation.50
8.1 Asymmetries in the US responses
The domestic effects of monetary policy tightenings and loosenings are relatively sym-
metric, with marginally stronger real effects in tightenings as shown by the response
of industrial production (in Figure 17).51 The interesting exception is the response of
CPI, which is remarkably asymmetric: it decreases marginally but not significantly in
case of a tightening, while expanding significantly in a loosening. This is an indication
of downward rigidity in prices to the monetary policy shock. Trade volume also reacts
slightly less to tightenings than to loosenings, possibly indicating a difference in the
monetary responses in third countries and hence in the exchange rates.
Marginal differences are also evident in the variables capturing financial channels –
risk appetite, excess bond premium, and the VIX – that respond more to contractionary
monetary policy. This is matched by the deeper rebalancing of risky assets in contrac-
tions. Interestingly the responses of the policy indicator, the U.S. 1-year treasury rate,
50To obtain samples starting from the early 1990s, we implement the following modifications in our
sample of EMEs: first, we drop two countries, Thailand and Russia, where all the available output
series start from the late 1990s. Second, we interpolate backwards a few important indicators, namely
output and stock prices, for some of EMEs. This would have otherwise greatly reduced our sample. The
endogenous set includes industrial production, CPI, stock prices, export/import ratio, trade volume,
nominal exchange rate, short-term and policy rates, financial conditions, risk appetite and cross-border
flows.
51The stronger effects of a contractionary monetary policy shock compared to an expansionary one
are in line with the recent literature on asymmetric responses to MP shocks (see, for example, Cover,
1992; Tenreyro and Thwaites, 2016; Barnichon and Matthes, 2018; Angrist et al., 2018)
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Figure 17: Asymmetric shocks to the US economy
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Note: Orange line – domestic responses to a contractionary US monetary policy shock. Dotted blue line – domestic
responses to an expansionary US monetary policy shock. Shocks are normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in
the 1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample 1990:01 – 2018:09. BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors.
Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
highlight differences in the duration of tightening and loosening cycles.
8.2 Asymmetries in the Global Transmission and AEs
The global economy responds to the shocks in an asymmetric manner (Figure 18).52 In-
dustrial production contracts slightly more and for longer during contractions, but the
difference is not statistically significant. The price responses are strongly asymmetric.
52A full set of responses can be found in the online appendix, Figure B.2 for the global economy and
Figure B.9 for advanced economies.
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Figure 18: Asymmetric shocks to the Global economy
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Note: Orange line – global responses to a contractionary US monetary policy shock. Dotted blue line – global responses
to an expansionary US monetary policy shock. Shocks are normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year
rate. High frequency identification. Sample 1990:01 – 2018:09. BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded
areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
Figure 19: Asymmetric shocks to the median advanced economy
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Note: Orange line – median responses of 15 advanced economies to a contractionary US monetary policy shock. Dotted
blue line – median responses of 15 advanced economies to an expansionary US monetary policy shock. Shocks are
normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample 1990:01 –
2018:09. BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
Commodity prices and the oil price do not experience meaningful changes after tight-
enings while they adjust upward in a loosening. This is reflected in the lack of reaction
of OECD CPI after a tightening relative to its expansion in a loosening.
A similar pattern is visible in the median responses f our 15 adva ced economies to
48
Figure 20: Asymmetric shocks to the median emerging economy
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Note: Orange line – median responses of 13 emerging economies to a contractionary US monetary policy shock. Dashed
blue line – median responses of 13 emerging economies to an expansionary US monetary policy shock. Shocks are
normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the US 1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample varies from
between 1990:01 and 1993:11 to between 2017:12 and 2018:09. BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded
areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
contractionary and expansionary shocks (Figure 19). Here, the asymmetry is marked,
with a deeper and longer contraction in output and the stock market in a tightening.
CPI contracts in tightenings and expands in loosenings but the downward rigidity of
prices is very visible.53
8.3 Asymmetries in Emerging Economies
Following a tightening in the US, the median emerging economy displayed in Figure
20 experiences a larger drop in the stock market and a more prolonged recession when
compared to a loosening. The domestic policy response can be assessed by observing
the response of the short-term interest rate and the asymmetries in the response of the
53One interesting result from this chart is that patterns of the ‘2.5–lemma’ are not clear, in contrast
to Han and Wei (2018): real spillover effects are evident in both tightenings and loosenings. Their
findings might be capturing a downward rigidity in CPI, not a lack of monetary autonomy. As Rey
(2016) pointed out, measuring monetary autonomy via the metric of correlation among short-term rates
does not fully take into account the financial spillover channels.
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Figure 21: Asymmetric shocks: 5 EMEs
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Note: Orange line – median responses of each EME to a contractionary US monetary policy shock. Dashed blue line
– median responses of each EME to an expansionary shock. Shocks are normalised to induce a 100 bp rise in the US
1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample as in Table A.12 (online appendix). For Brazil, we replace IP by
monthly GDP interpolated backwards from 1996:01 to 1990:01. BVAR(12) with asymmetric priors. Shaded areas are
90% posterior coverage bands.
nominal exchange rate. The depreciation of the currency in a tightening is limited when
compared to the appreciation in a loosening. In the aggregate the fear of depreciation
trumps the fear of appreciation.54
Policy responses and country structural features are a large part of the story. We
zoom in on single countries – Turkey, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and South Africa – to provide
a more granular view of how policy regimes and country-specific fragilities interact
54These results are in line with those displayed in Figure 7, with the notable exception of short-term
rates. It is important to remember that the sample length and pool of countries are different.
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in shaping asymmetric responses to US policy shocks. This is an interesting pool of
countries that either experiences currency crises (Mexico in 1994, Brazil in 1999, and
Turkey in 2001) or conducted particularly prudent monetary policy (Chile, South Africa)
for fear of exposing themselves to global shocks.55
The responses show remarkable differences when compared to the median aggregated
ones. Following a tightening, global financial conditions worsen and capital starts flowing
out of an economy; this is visible in the responses of the domestic currencies that fall in
all countries but Chile. Interestingly, the Chilean peso only reacts to a loosening, which
would be consistent with ‘fear of depreciation’. Inflation tends to rise due to imported
goods becoming more expensive. The price responses are now very different from the
aggregate ones. All the 5 EMEs experience a price hike following the US tightening. We
observe particularly dramatic rises in Turkey and Brazil. For instance, Turkey’s CPI
increases by 5% on impact for a tightening and the effect persists for 12 months. For a
loosening the response of prices is not significant, as there is no effect on the exchange
rate.
Central banks react to the exchange rates plummeting by hiking rates in the attempt
of steadying the economy. In fact, in all cases except Mexico, we observe an increase
in the short-term rate response upon a US tightening and a decrease in the case of
a loosening. This in turn exacerbates the contraction of the national economy. In
particular, we observe a dramatic surge in the short-term rate on impact for Turkey,
Brazil, and Chile. This may bear the pattern of the crises experienced by these countries,
and is an indication of strong financial spillovers as discussed in Gourinchas (2018).
Indeed, if investors have limited trust in the central bank, expectations can become self-
fulfilling with the currency falling, interest rates and inflation rising, and the economy
deteriorating. Overall, the responses show a pattern of an emerging market crisis similar
to what described by Carstens and Shin (2019).56
55For Brazil, we replace industrial production by monthly GDP interpolated backward from 1996:01
to 1990:01. The results we obtain by using industrial production are qualitatively similar.
56Hoek et al. (2020) provide evidence that while the signalling channel of US monetary policy (good
macro news - higher policy rates) generates only modest spillovers, contractionary MP shocks can lead
to a significant tightening of EME financial conditions.
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9 Conclusion
We studied how US monetary policy is transmitted across the globe by employing a high-
frequency identification of policy shocks and large VAR techniques. Our identification
controls for the information effects of monetary policy while allowing for the separate
analysis of tightenings and loosenings of the policy stance. Incorporating a large dataset
of macroeconomic and financial indicators at a monthly frequency, we study the effects
of US monetary policy shocks on the global economy, the Euro Area, 15 AEs and 15
EMEs. We also provide median responses for selected groups of countries based on their
income levels, the degree of openness to capital, exchange rate regimes, dollar trade
invoicing, and gross dollar exposure. Our study provides evidence on the channels of
propagation of US monetary policy shocks overseas, as well as documenting asymmetries
in the responses of peripheral economies to expansionary and contractionary US shocks.
We report a set of novel findings. First, we find that a US monetary tightening
induces macro and financial contractionary responses in the US and across the globe.
This testifies to the role of dollar as a global currency. Second, US monetary policy
spillovers affect both advanced economies and emerging markets, irrespectively of their
monetary policy regime. The country-level responses are much less heterogeneous than
previously reported. Third, AEs and EMEs that are more open to capital experience
stronger real and nominal effects compared to less-open ones. This highlights a potential
role for capital controls as an additional policy dimension. Fourth, by disentangling the
channels of transmission, we observe that contractionary responses of commodity prices
and financial variables are important determinants of negative spillover effects on output
and prices. Finally, we find that the responses of output and stock prices of the US,
the global economy, and third countries are more persistent in a tightening than in a
loosening. CPI instead shows downward rigidity, that is accounted for by the downward
rigidity of oil and commodity prices. Importantly, the policy responses of countries that
have been affected by currency crises are remarkably asymmetric.
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Table A.7: Sources of short term interest rates
Short-term interest rate Source
Australia Interbank 3 Month OECD MEI
Austria VIBOR 3 month OECD MEI
Belgium T-bill Rate (3 months) Datastream
Brazil Deposit Rate (90 day) IMF IFS
Canada T-bill Rate (3 months) IMF IFS
Chile Deposit Rate (90 day) IMF IFS
China Deposit Rate (90 day) Datastream
Colombia Deposit Rate (90 day) OECD MEI
Czech Rep. PRIBOR 3 Month OECD MEI
Denmark CIBOR 3 Month OECD MEI
Finland HELIBOR 3 Month IMF IFS
France T-bill Rate (3 months) IMF IFS
Germany FIBOR 3 Month OECD MEI
Hungary T-bill Rate (3 months) IMF IFS
India Lending Rate Datastream
Italy T-bill Rate (3 months) OECD MEI
Japan T-bill Rate (3 months) IMF IFS
Malaysia T-bill Rate (3 months) IMF IFS
Mexico T-bill Rate (3 months) OECD MEI
Netherlands AIBOR 3 month OECD MEI
Norway NIBOR 3 month OECD MEI
Philippines Deposit Rate (90 day) IMF IFS
Poland WIBOR 3 month OECD MEI
Russia Interbank 1-3 Month OECD MEI
South Africa T-bill Rate (3 months) IMF IFS
Spain Interbank 3 Month OECD MEI
Sweden T-bill Rate (3 months) IMF IFS
Thailand Interbank 1 Month Datastream
Turkey Deposit Rate (90 day) IMF IFS
UK T-bill Rate (3 months) Bank of England
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Table A.8: Classification of countries by Financial Market Openness
Chinn-Ito Index, the Sample Average
ADVANCED Australia 0.828 EMERGING Brazil 0.369
Austria 0.968 Chile 0.635
Belgium 0.968 China 0.166
Canada 1 Colombia 0.403
Denmark 0.994 Czech Rep. 0.951
Finland 0.968 Hungary 0.907
France 0.948 India 0.166
Germany 1 Malaysia 0.411
Italy 0.948 Mexico 0.674
Japan 0.989 Philippines 0.389
Netherlands 0.990 Poland 0.476
Norway 0.895 Russia 0.465
Spain 0.905 South Africa 0.169
Sweden 0.946 Thailand 0.284
UK 1 Turkey 0.323
ADVANCED MEDIAN 0.968 EMERGING MEDIAN 0.403
TOP 33% 0.989 TOP 33% 0.469
BOTTOM 33% 0.948 BOTTOM 33% 0.354
ST.DEV 0.048 ST.DEV 0.245
Advanced Emerging
Open Less Open Open Less Open
(Top 33%) (Bottom 33%) (Top 33%) (Bottom 33%)
Canada Australia Chile Brazil
Denmark France Czech Rep. India
Germany Italy Hungary South Africa
Netherlands Norway Mexico Thailand
UK Spain Poland Turkey
Sweden
Sample Average 0.997 0.912 0.729 0.222
Notes: The measure of financial openness is the arithmetic mean of the ka open index
from Chinn and Ito (2006), which has the value from 0 (mostly closed) to 1 (mostly
open). The sample is 1990 – 2017 for AEs, but it varies among EMEs: from 1990:01 -
2019:09 for the longest (South Africa) to 2002:09 - 2018:09 for the shortest (Colombia).
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Table A.9: Classification of countries by Exchange Rate Regimes
Ilzetzki-Reinhart-Rogoff (2019) Fine Classification
Floats Managed floats Median IRR Crawling pegs Median IRR
14 AEs∗ Brazil 12 China 5
Czech Republic Canada 12 India 7
Hungary Chile 12 Philippines 10
Poland Colombia 12 Thailand 11
Mexico 12
South Africa 12
Notes: Medians across sample period of each country. 12: +/- 5% moving band; 11: +/- 2%
moving band; 10: crawling band +/- 5%; 7: de facto crawling peg; 5: pre-announced crawling
peg. Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are classified as floaters, since their currencies
are anchored to Euro.
* 14 AEs are all of the AEs in our sample minus Canada. The median value of all 14 countries
is 14, which corresponds to a freely floating regime in the Ilzetzki et al. (2019) classification.
Table A.10: Classification of EMEs by Trade Invoicing in Dollars
Exports Imports
Country Avg. shares High Low Avg. shares Top 1/3 Bottom 1/3
Brazil 0.943 • 0.844 •
Chile NA NA
China NA NA
Colombia 0.990 • 0.990 •
Czech Rep. 0.136 • 0.192 •
Hungary 0.181 • 0.265 •
India 0.864 • 0.855 •
Malaysia 0.9 • 0.9∗ •
Mexico NA NA
Philippines NA NA
Poland 0.305 • 0.303 •
Russia NA NA
South Africa 0.52 0.52∗ •
Thailand 0.821 0.789
Turkey 0.461 • 0.591
MEDIAN 0.670 0.690
TOP 33% 0.864 0.844
BOTTOM 33% 0.461 0.52
Notes: Data from Gopinath (2015). Numbers in the second and fourth columns represent the
average share of exports/imports into a country invoiced in US dollars, averaged across all
years starting from 1999. We calculate the average, top and bottom tertile values excluding 5
countries with no data available (indicated as ‘NA’). A country belongs to the ‘High’ group if
its share of exports/imports invoiced in the USD corresponds to the top tertile and the ‘low’
group if it falls below the bottom tertile among 10 EMEs listed above.
* Only exports invoicing data are available for Malaysia and South Africa. We assume that
import USD invoicing shares are roughly the same as the export ones for these two countries.
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Table A.11: Classification of EMEs by Gross Dollar Exposure
Country Total USD Assets + Liabilities High Exposure Low Exposure
Brazil 35.443
Chile 80.519 •
China 38.887
Colombia 44.310
Czech Rep. 30.494 •
Hungary 28.121 •
India 24.684 •
Malaysia 78.865 •
Mexico 45.227
Philippines 55.743 •
Poland 20.216 •
Russia 61.570 •
South Africa 30.956 •
Thailand 47.550 •
Turkey 38.548
MEDIAN 38.887
TOP 33% 46.001
BOTTOM 33% 33.947
Notes: We construct a measure of gross dollar exposure for each country by taking the sum
of total USD assets and liabilities as a share of domestic GDP, from the dataset of Be´ne´trix
et al. (2015). Numbers in the second column represent the average of this measure over
the sample, which varies from 1990:01 – 2019:09 for the longest (South Africa) to 2002:09 –
2018:09 for the shortest (Colombia). A country belongs to the ‘High exposure’ group if its
gross dollar exposure corresponds to the top tertile and the ‘Low exposure’ group if it falls
below the bottom tertile among 15 EMEs listed above.
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Table A.12: Country coverage for EME asymmetric responses
Countries Estimation Sample Countries Estimation Sample
Brazil 1990:01 - 2018:09 Malaysia 1990:01 - 2017:12
Chile 1991:01 - 2018:06 Mexico 1990:01 - 2018:02
China 1990:12 - 2018:08 Philippines 1990:01 - 2018:07
Colombia 1992:01 - 2018:09 Poland 1991:06 - 2018:09
Czech Rep. 1993:11 - 2018:09 South Africa 1990:01 - 2018:09
Hungary 1991:06 - 2018:09 Turkey 1990:01 - 2018:09
India 1993:01 - 2018:04
Notes: The set of endogenous variables includes five main local indicators: in-
dustrial production, CPI, stock prices, exchange rate, and short-term interest
rate. It also includes all US variables detailed in Table A.2, the global controls
and CRB commodity price index. The end-of-month stock price series is in-
terpolated backwards by regressing it on the monthly average stock prices by
simple OLS regression and obtaining the fitted values for Brazil (from 1994:07
to 1990:01), China (from 1994:05 to 1990:12), and Poland (from 1994:03 to
1991:05). For the Philippines, we interpolate backwards industrial production
from 1996:01 to 1990:01 by using Kalman filter techniques and exploiting the
correlations obtained from a BVAR(12) estimated on all indicators for the
Philippines.
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Table A.13: Variables Used
Transformation Model
Variable Source log RW Prior (1) (2) (3) (4)
Industrial Production Index OECD • • √ √ √ √
CPI OECD • • √ √ √ √
Core CPI OECD • • √ √
Nominal Stock Price Index Datastream • • √ √ √ √
Export/Import ratio OECD • √ √ √ √
Trade Volume OECD • • √ √ √ √
Nominal USD Exchange Rate BIS • • √ √ √ √
Short-term Interest Rate OECD
√ √ √ √
Policy Rate BIS
√ √ √
Long-term Interest Rate IMF
√ √ √
Financial Conditions Index, CBC CBC • √ √ √
Risk Appetite, CBC CBC
√ √ √
Cross-Border Flows Index, CBC CBC • √ √ √ √
Fixed Income Holdings, CBC CBC • • √
Equity Holdings, CBC CBC • • √
Global price of Brent Crude FRED • • √ √ √ √
Global Economic Activity Index Kilian (2019)
√ √ √ √
CRB Commodity Price Index Datastream • • √
US Industrial Production Index OECD • • √ √ √ √
US CPI OECD • • √ √ √ √
US Core CPI OECD • • √ √
US Nominal Stock Price Index Datastream • • √ √ √ √
US Export/Import ratio OECD • √ √ √ √
US Trade Volume OECD • • √ √ √ √
US Nominal Effective Exchange Rate BIS • • √ √ √ √
US 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate FRED
√ √ √
US Financial Conditions Index, CBC CBC • √ √ √
US Risk Appetite, CBC CBC
√ √ √
US Cross-Border Flows Index, CBC CBC • √ √ √ √
US Fixed Income Holdings, CBC CBC • • √
US Equity Holdings, CBC CBC • • √
US Excess Bond Premium FRED
√ √ √ √
CBOE VIX FRED • √ √ √ √
US 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate FRED
√ √ √ √
Models: (1) Bilateral BVAR specification for AEs in Section 4, Euro Area in Section 6, AE groups based
on capital openness measures in Section 7, and asymmetric effects of the shocks in AEs in Section 8; (2)
specification for the study of transmission channels in AEs in Section 4; (3) specification for EMEs in Section
5 (the same specification is used for the analysis of transmission channels), for Mexico, China, and India in
Section 6, and all other group exercises in Section 7; (4) specification for the analysis of asymmetric effects of
the shocks across EMEs in Section 8.
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Figure B.1: NIW v. Asymmetric Prior comparison, US
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Note: Solid orange line – BVAR(12) with optimal tightness hyperparameter computed as in Giannone et al. (2015).
Dashed blue line – with asymmetric priors, following Chan (2019). Domestic responses to a contractionary US monetary
policy shock, normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. Sample 1990:01 – 2018:09. Shaded areas
are 90% posterior coverage bands.
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Figure B.2: Asymmetric shocks, the Global economy
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Note: Solid orange line – global responses to a contractionary US monetary policy shock. Dashed blue line – global
responses to an expansionary US monetary policy shock. Shocks are normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in
the 1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample 1990:01 – 2018:09. BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors.
Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
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Figure B.3: Channels, the Global economy
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Note: Lines correspond to impulse responses obtained with the baseline specification (solid red); assuming the Brent
crude and commodity prices do not react (solid black); assuming the nominal exchange rates do not react (dashed
black); finally, assuming financial conditions, risk appetite cross-border flows, the excess bond premium, and VIX do not
react (dash-dotted black). Shock is normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. High-frequency
identification. Sample 1990:01 - 2018:09. BVAR(12).
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Figure B.4: Nominal exchange rate, local currency/USD, Advanced
Economies
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Note: Responses of nominal exchange rate in 15 advanced economies to a contractionary US monetary policy shock,
normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample reported in
Table 1 (in the paper). BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded areas are 68% and 90% posterior coverage
bands.
Figure B.5: Stock Prices, Advanced Economies
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Note: Responses of stock price indices in 15 advanced economies to a contractionary US monetary policy shock, normalised
to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample reported in Table 1 (in the
paper). BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded areas are 68% and 90% posterior coverage bands.
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Figure B.6: Long-term rates, Advanced Economies
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Note: Responses of long-term government bond yields in 15 advanced economies to a contractionary US monetary policy
shock, normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample reported
in Table 1 (in the paper). BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded areas are 68% and 90% posterior coverage
bands.
Figure B.7: Cross-border Flows, Advanced Economies
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Note: Responses of cross-border flows in 15 advanced economies to a contractionary US monetary policy shock, normalised
to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample reported in Table 1 (in the
paper). BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded areas are 68% and 90% posterior coverage bands.
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Figure B.8: Trade volume, Advanced Economies
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Note: Responses of trade volume in 15 advanced economies to a contractionary US monetary policy shock, normalised
to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample reported in Table 1 (in the
paper). BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded areas are 68% and 90% posterior coverage bands.
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Figure B.9: Asymmetric shocks, Advanced Economies
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Note: Solid orange line – median responses of 15 advanced economies to a contractionary US monetary policy shock.
Dashed blue line – median responses of 15 advanced economies to an expansionary US monetary policy shock. Shocks
are normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample reported in
Table 1 (in the paper). BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
XXII
Figure B.10: Channels, Advanced Economies
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Note: Lines correspond to impulse responses obtained with the baseline specification (solid red); assuming the policy rate
does not react (solid black); the Brent crude and commodity prices do not react (dashed black); exchange rates do not
react (dashed-dotted black); financial conditions, risk appetite, cross-border flows, the excess bond premium, and VIX
do not react (dotted black). Shock is normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. High-frequency
identification. Sample reported in Table 1 (in the paper). BVAR(12).
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Figure B.11: Stock Prices, Emerging Economies
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Note: Responses of stock price indices in 15 emerging economies to a contractionary US monetary policy shock, normalised
to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample reported in Table 1 (in the
paper). BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded areas are 68% and 90% posterior coverage bands.
Figure B.12: Long-term rates, Emerging Economies
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Note: Responses of long-term government bond yields in 15 emerging economies to a contractionary US monetary policy
shock, normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. High frequency identification.Sample reported in
Table 1 (in the paper). BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded areas are 68% and 90% posterior coverage
bands.
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Figure B.13: Cross-border Flows, Emerging Economies
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Note: Responses of cross-border flows in 15 emerging economies to a contractionary US monetary policy shock, normalised
to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. High frequency identification. Sample reported in Table 1 (in the
paper). BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded areas are 68% and 90% posterior coverage bands.
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Figure B.14: Channels, Emerging Economies
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Note: Lines correspond to impulse responses obtained with the baseline specification (solid red); assuming the policy rate
does not react (solid black); the Brent crude and commodity prices do not react (dashed black); exchange rates do not
react (dashed-dotted black); financial conditions, risk appetite, cross-border flows, the excess bond premium, and VIX
do not react (dotted black). Shock is normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. High-frequency
identification. Sample reported in Table 1 (in the paper). BVAR(12).
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Figure B.15: Emerging Economies by USD Trade Invoicing
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Note: Solid orange line – median responses of 5 emerging economies (Brazil, Colombia, Thailand, India, and Malaysia),
whose USD trade invoicing both in terms of exports and imports corresponds to the top 1/3 among 15 EMEs. Dashed
blue line – median responses of 5 emerging economies (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Turkey and South Africa),
whose USD trade invoicing both in terms of exports and imports corresponds to the bottom 1/3. Data on trade invoices
in USD are from Gopinath (2015). Shock is normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. BVAR
(12). Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
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Figure B.16: Emerging Economies by Gross USD Exposures
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Note: Solid orange line – median responses of 5 emerging economies (Chile, Malaysia, Philippines, Russia, and Thailand),
whose gross USD exposure corresponds to the top 1/3 among 15 EMEs. Dashed blue line – median responses of 5
emerging economies (Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Poland, and South Africa), whose gross USD exposure corresponds
to the bottom 1/3. Data on gross USD exposure are from Be´ne´trix et al. (2015). Shock is normalised to induce a 100
basis point increase in the 1-year rate. BVAR (12). Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
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Figure B.17: EMEs by capital control, Fernandez et al. (2016)
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Note: Solid orange line – median responses of 5 emerging economies (Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and
Turkey), whose overall capital restriction corresponds to the bottom 1/3 among 15 EMEs. Dashed blue line – median
responses of 5 emerging economies (China, India, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand), whose overall capital restriction
corresponds to the top 1/3. Data on overall capital restriction are from Ferna´ndez et al. (2016b). Shock is normalised to
induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. BVAR (12). Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
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